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ABSTRACT 
The central purpose of . this.paper is to critically examine and to 
render cons is tent three major areas of Ayn Rand ' s  ethical philosophy 
"Objectivism. " The three areas under cons ideration will be the in trins ic 
good and the bas ic extrins ic goods of Objectivism , the Objectivis t 
theory of obligation , and the Obj ectivis t pos i tion concerning happ iness. 
The task of  analyzing these three areas of  Obj ectivism will 
involve , firs t ,  a des cription of the pos ition under cons ideration , 
second , an analys is o f  the meaning o f  the pos i tion , and third , an 
analysi� of  the internal consistency and/or truth o f  the position under 
consideration . This.analys is shal l be used in each of  the areas lis ted 
above . 
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INTRODUCTION 
I have undertaken the task of analy zing and ,  where needed , of 
rende ring consis tent the ethical philos ophy of Ayn Rand fo r two princi­
pal reasons : Firs t ,  s ince her philosophy is known primarily through 
her fictional wr iting , rathe r than organized treatises.or papers, her 
ethical philos ophy is very of ten mi sunde rs tood . Even in her essays it  
is  difficul t to  separate.her psycho logy , politics , and me taphys ics , 
from her ethical pos ition . I believe that this s i tuation creates a 
scholarly n�ed for an analys is of her wo rk . Se cond , I have been greatly 
influenced by the s tylistic power Rand employs. Since it is the clarity 
and cons is tency of her.thought that I am interes ted in , rather than the 
power of her s tyle , I hope that wo rk on this paper will enable me to 
increase my crit ical dis tance in order to achieve a true perspective of 
her·ethical pos ition .  
1 
CHAPTER I 
LIFE AND C ONSC IOUSNES S 
Ayn Rand ' s  ethical position i2 perhaps aptly descr ibed as a rule-
egois m .  The rule ( s ) , however , will no t be discussed until Cha pt er III . 
In Rand ' s  system one ' s  lif e is t he intrinsic good . All that functions 
to maintain one ' s  life is . extrinsically-good . Deat h is th� intr ins ic 
evil . All t hat functions to either cause one ' s  death or reduc e the 
ab i+ity of -one to live is extr ins ically evil . The examination of her 
arguments concerning t he _estab lishment o f  (1)  life ' s  being the intr ins ic 
good and ( 2 )  consciousnes s .being extr insically good , concern a major 
portion of t his c h�pter . 
This study of Ob jec tivism ' s  bas ic claims and consequent sub-
principles begins with a s tatement of  b iologic and psyc hologic . impor t :  
t he s tructure of real ity nec ess itates t hat man guide his ac tions accord-
ing to a code or pr inc iples der ived fro m his nature .  The s truc ture of 
real ity tha� necessitates this is t ha t  man is . a living enti ty po ssessing 
pro per ties whic h enable him to live under certain conditions, but no t 
under o t her s . It  is "et hics as a science [ t hat] deals wi th discovering 
and defining • • • a code"
1 
that will ena ble man to live according to 
his na ture . Man is an enti ty capable of valuing . I t  is only because 
he is alive that this is so . 
1 Ayn Rand , The Vir tue of  Selfis hnes s (New Yor k: New American 
Library, 1964 ) ,  p. 73. 
2 
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There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe :  
exis tence o r  non-exis tence--and i t  pertains to a s ingle class 
o f  entities : to living organisms . • • . It is  only a living 
organism that faces a cons tant alternat ive : the issue of life 
or death . • • • It is only the concept "Life" that makes th� 
concept "Value" pos sible . It is only a living entity t hat things 
can be good or evil . 2 
The no tion o f  " fundamen tal alternative" needs to be expli cated . 
What makes the is sue of  life and death the one bas ic al ternative ? It 
is that the choice between these two alternatives leads to very different 
consequences . If one chooses to live , this choice makes possi ble all 
o ther consequent alternatives of one ' s  life . On the o ther hand , if one 
chooses to die , or j ust dies , no further alternatives ar� ever pres ented 
to t.he agent . The dead do not make choices concerning what to wear , 
eat , or  do . Only a l iving entity c�n make these , . or any other ,  choices . 
Therefore , when Rand speaks o f  the fundamental alternative being that o f  
life or death , she ·is speaki ng quite li terally . She means the one 
alternative , l ife , is a necess ary .condition , the pre-requis ite , o f  all . 
other alternatives . She does not mean , however , that it is the suffi-
cient condition .of  one ' s  cho ices . The other alternative , death , has no 
subsequent al ternatives at all . It is in thi s way that the issue o f  
life an d  death i s  the bas ic or fundamental al ternative fo r all living 
entities.  
S ince it is only to a living entity that things c an be good or 
evil , Rand formulates her ethics on the princip le that this �£undamental 
alternative exis ts for all living things alike . It seems to me that the 
2 Ayn Rand , Atlas Shrugged (New York : Rando m House , 195 8) , 
pp . 1012 , 1013. 
statement that_it is only to living entities that_things can be good or 
evil is obviously.true. Rocks, roads, clouds, air, etc., do not have 
the capacity to judge what.things are for them or against them. It is 
certain that rocks, roads, clouds,_and air do exist although they are 
not living entities. Thus, while Rand first states that fundamental 
alternative in terms of existence or non-existence, what she means is 
the alternative between life and death.· 
On the diffetence between living and non-living creatures, Rand 
states: 
Only a living entity can have goals or can originate them. 
And it is only a living organism that has the capacity for 
self-generated, goal-directed action. On the physical level, 
the functions of all living organisms are actions gener-
ated by the organism itse+f and directed to a single goal: 
the maintenance of the organism's life. An organism's life 
depends on two factors: the material or fuel which it needs 
from the outside, from its physical background, and the action 
of its own body, the action of using that fuel1properly. What 
standard determines what is proper in this context? The 
standard is the organism's life, or: that which is required 
for the orggnism's survival. No choice is open to an organism 
�n this issue: that which is required for its survival.is 
determined by its nature, by the kind of entity it is • • • •  
Life can be kept in existence only by a_constant process of 
self-sustaining action. The goal of that action, the ultimate 
value which, to be kept, must be gained through its every 
moment is the organism's -�·3 
4 
This passage is intended to provide a basis for the philosophic position 
that an organism's life is the ultimate value or intrinsic good. It 
can be viewed as containing two separate, yet related, assertions. 
The relation existing between the two assertions is a form of the 
classical argument fro psychology to ethics. By showing that the 
3 Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 16-17. 
functions of  all living organisms are directed to the same goal Rand 
hopes to prove that.the goal to which they are all directed is the end­
in-itself or intrinsic value . The fir s t  as sertion deals wi th living 
entit�es from a b iologic , phys ical , and environmental point  o f  view. 
The second a�serts the philos ophic�! position held by the Obj ectivis ts 
cqncerning the intrinsic good. A question arises regarding the s tate­
ment that all phys ical occurrences within the organism are.directed to 
the maintenance of ·  the organism ' s  life , namely , is this true ? It· 
certainly is true that biologis ts and physiologis ts commonly explain . 
5 
the di fferent cell types , tis sue types , organs , and sys tems of  organs in 
ques tion wi th a view to the relation each of these has in maintaining 
the life of the organism . Thinking critically, however ,  about this 
descriptive frame of reference of roles and functions , ·one mus t try to 
as certain whether it is true that all the �omplex workings between cells , 
tissues , organs , and sys tems o f  the entity aim toward the maintenance 
of that entity ' s  life . It . is one thing to s ay that the re.d blood cells , 
do , in fact , carry oxygen to all parts of  the body , and that without 
this process man would die , and quite ano ther to maintain that this 
proces s i tself has the goal of  maintaining·t�e life of a man . In a 
like manner the different systems o f  an organism , ·e . g . , the digestive, 
the respi�atory , and the nervous system do indeed function and wi th 
that functioning do maintain the life of an organism,  generally speaking . 
However , to presuppose that.these processes--from the cellular to the 
system level--aim at , rather than resul t  in , the survival o f  the organ- · 
ism is an as sumption tl,l
_
a� scientists do not . . generally make . Rand asserts 
6 
this as though·sc�ence had dis covered its truth . Therefore , let me s ay 
that the teleological implications involved in saying that the pro cesses 
aim toward the .maintenance o f  life are philosophi cally colorful (and 
philosophically arguable , perhaps ) ,  but they are·not s cientifically 
known . The same may be said o f  those occurrences or  processes which 
result in the equilibrium o f . the environment ,  namely , senes cence and 
pro creation . Philosophically speaking , these two processes may be 
thought to presuppose the death.o f  individual organisms . However , to 
ci te the proces s as . having that as an aim :o r goal is s imply s c ientifically 
unknown . It is precisely this step which delineates the line between 
philo sophy and science in this particular case . However ,  Rand implies 
--the-teleological account is s cientifically grounded , rather than one of 
her ph ilosophic assump tions . 
This is n�t to say that s cience has no us e for teleology o r pur­
pos es . In genetic and evolutiona�y theory these concepts play a very 
important role . But even here the des crip tions of certain pro cess es are 
not confused with an as cription o f.purposes . to these pro cesses.  
Explication o f  Rand ' s  model o f  the organism and the " fuel " is  
necessary at this point . Rand�s as sertion is  that an o rganism ' s  l ife 
depends on two factors , one being the.mate �ial or fuel from its environ­
ment , and �e ,second being the utilization of that · fuel by .its own b ody . 
It is a fact that without phys ical sus tenance , e . g.,  air , water, and 
food , and without the capacity to b reathe the air , to drink the wate r ,  
or  diges t the food , animals would perish . In claiming this it is obvious 
that Rand is on solid ground scientifically . I do not believe that Rand 
is arguing that thes e are the only two condit ions required , the 
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sufficient conditions , or . an organism' s life. Nor do I think that she 
is arguing th�t the entire physical background of an organism is "fuel . "  
Needless to say ,  there are a great many biospheric processes whic�,  ·if 
halted , c9uld end animal life . The rain and water cycles , sunlight  and 
photosynthe tic processes , decompos ition o f  organic particles into in­
organic particles ( to name a few) have a great bearing on.the ability 
o f  an organism to survive . These processes canno t be s aid to serve as 
"fuel " even in Rand ' s  sense o f  the word . There fore a qualification o f  
her s tatement is  needed . A change from calling these "the " tw o  fac tors 
to s imply "two fac tors " would be sufficient to avoid her being mis ­
construed . 
When Rand speaks . o f  the "s tandard" that detel"D;lines what is 
"pro per" concerning the l�fe proces ses , such as breathing , _or ingestioll 
o f  food , she is re ferring to b iologic or physiologic facts of nature , 
viz. , that the kind o f  organism I am de termines the conditions , generally 
speaking , that mus t be availab le for me to live . For example , a plant 
mus t have air , water , sunlight , and accommodating temperatures to live . 
The s tandard that determines this is the phys ical s tructure of  the 
organism with all that is entailed by being a certain kind o f , or genera 
o f ,  plant . Rand ' s  statement concerning the s tandard o f  propriety is a 
disinteres ted on� noting that an organism ' s  biologic structure is a 
determining factor o f  the organism ' s  ab ility to live , and the condit ions 
required by it to l�ve . 
In s ummary , then , I .agree that "Otlly a living entity can have 
goals or originate them. And it .is only a living entity that has the 
capacity for self generated , goal directed ac tion" {Cf. p .  4). I 
further agree that two factors necessary to the maintenance of an 
organism ' s  life are material from its environment and the ab ility to 
8 
us e that material as sus tenance . I do no t agree , however , with the 
as sertion that physical processes aim toward , or have the goal of main­
t�ining an organism ' s  life. This is a philos ophically debatable pos it ion 
that.Rand.treats as scientifically known . 
At_ this point it is important .to ask whether.the· cons iderations 
of the last  few paragraphs concerning the b�ologic f acts of life signi­
ficantly undercut the.philosophic position that the intrins ic good is 
an entity ' s  life?  I do  not think that they do . · The as sertion that life 
is intrinsically valuable has two other arguments in its favor. One of  
these is  Rand ' s  argument regarding the fundamental alternative between 
life and death. It consists  of the following s tep s :  An organism faces 
the cons tant - alternative of l ife and death . The death o f  an organism 
negates any meaningful ascription of any values for that organism,  j us t  
as the death o f  all living entities would negate the ascription o f  
ul timate or.extrins ic values for anything . All values pre suppose and 
depend on the organism ' s  being alive. Therefore , it is the life of the 
entity that  is of  in trinsic value . 
An initially plaus ib le refutation to this argument is to ass ert 
that l i�e is a precondition of the achievemen� of good ( s )  such as 
pleasure or knowledge , .which makes it.instrumen tally good , rather than 
in t�ins ically good , and to go on. to s ay that the�e ends , i . e. ,  p leasure 
and/ or.knowledge are the intrinsic good ( s). 
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This argument, however , does no t show that life is no t intrins i­
cally good . It does show that life is sometimes cons idered a necessary 
condi tion to the ·achievement of other .. goods . For one and the same thing 
may be bo th.intrins ically and extrins ically valuab le . Many things such 
as love, knowledge , hea�th, and happiness are either contribut ive and/or 
ins trument�! in the . securing, sus taining, or bet tering of one ' s  life . 
Hence a similar argument can be offered maintaining that life is an 
intrins ic good , while these other things are extrins ic goods. This shows 
that it is pos s ible that life is an intrinsic good in its own·right 
even though ( 1 )  it is not recognized as such , or (2 ) there are o ther 
intrins ic goods , and that life serves as a means to achieving them. 
Thus , the assertion that life is a precondition of happ iness or knowledge 
in no way affects the content ion that it.is intrinsically valuable , nor 
proves that these other goods are intrinsically valuable. 
Rand speaks of one!s life as the intrinsic good , or the ul timate 
value . There is a huge difference in maintaining this po sition and 
maintaining that life is an in trinsi c·good . The former position implies 
that life is the only.in trins ic good while the lat ter allows that there 
may be o ther.intrins ic goods • 
. In order to show that life is � in trins ic value, a person . mus t 
show that it has a non-derivat ive value, i.e., that it is go od for the 
kind o f  thing that it is . On the other hand, in order to show that it 
is the intrinsic good , one mus t
' show uot only that it is valuable for 
the kind o f . thing that it is, but also that.othe r suppos ed intrinsic 
goods do not have non-derivat ive value . 
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Trying to consider · one ' s  life wi thout a view to its al ternatives 
and possibilities is not an easy task . Life has this peculiar feature . 
It does have alternatives and poss ibilities , even for t.he lowest animals .  
This is part o f  what our concept o f  life is . Even a planarium or a tree. 
has possib ilities , though from a person ' s  point o f  view very limited 
ones . By "possibilities " I mean no t only the processes o f  a biochemical 
nature which scientists refer to as "life processes" but·. the poss ib ilities 
and al ternatives which spring up with the organization of these processes . 
The proces ses o f  life are biochemical.and electro-phys ical. The 
organization of the se processes in cells , tis sues , organs , organ sys tems, 
and organisms give rise to the different activities of  . inges tion , growth , 
reproduction , regeneration , energy utilization , irritab ility responses 
( to name a few) that all living entities exhibit so  far as the complexity 
o f  organization and their development of  o rganization permits . In 
higher animals ,  as opposed to lower animals and plants , the specifi c 
pos sibilities include thos � of thought and emo tion . It is these differ­
ent possibilities and alternatives that make up our concept of  life , and 
dis tinguish it from our concep t of inanimate matt�r . 
This does no t amount to evaluating life in terms o f  its conse­
quences , for all par ticular consequences can be ·disregarded . The fact 
that life is the kind of thing that it . is , that involves proces ses , 
possib ilities , and alternatives not found in non-living existen ts , such 
as sound waves or air , makes it.intrins ically valuable . 
When I calmly and.coo ly reflect on the propos ition that li fe is 
intr�nsically .YBluable , I can , in contemplation , ·leave out certain 
11 
properties of  my , life , say ,.its particular joys or  pains . I ·can reflect 
that it is valuable regardless of these because of the kind of thing that 
it is . In other words , it is valuable in and o f  i ts el f . 
I can only suggest further that each person , when trying to dis­
cover if his life is intrinsically valuable , try to disregard the 
particular s ituations that he has encountered . or will encounter , and 
re flect solely on the difference between animacy .and inanimacy . This 
may not be an easy task. Ask a man'· being tortured if he views his life 
as intrinsically valuable , and the pain he feels may determine his 
answer . Similarly, ask a man who is sated , well-off , and happy if  he 
views his life as in trinsically valuable , and hi s sel f-s at is faction may 
influence his answer . However,  i f  one can , and I believe one can , 
extricate the particular moments o f . j oy or  pain , and consider the mere 
ability to live and the l�fe one has , then I believe that its intrinsic 
value will be obvious . 
The dis cuss ion above shows , I think , . that one ' s  life is intrin­
s ically good. I shall now cons ider Rand ' s  positiqn that life is the 
in trinsic good . 
In my es timation Rand does not adequately treat the question of  
whe ther there are o ther intrins ically valuable things , such as , happ i� 
ness.  By "adequately" I mean that she . does not  prove , no r does she 
even attempt · to prove , that these do no t have non-derivative value . Her 
consideration o f  o ther proposed in trinsic values , such as happiness ,  
at tenp t to dis credit them on the grounds that they can . not serve effec� 
tively as a s tandard for action ,  whereas one ' s  life can . While this may 
be true, unles s Rand can show that happines s is good only for its 
cons equences , she will have to admit the possib i lity of  pluralism . 
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We shall find in Chapter II� of th is thes is that Rand ' s  posi tions 
concerning the value of one ' s  happines s and the value of one ' s  life are 
not' clearly dis tinguished . .This may be one reason that she . does no t 
at temp t to show that happiness is not intrins ically , i . e . , in and o f  
itsel f , good . 
Rand tries to show that happiness cannot serve as an ef fective 
standard of  act ion·by pointing out that actions such as s tealing and 
working hones tly , keeping _and b reaking promis es , and telling the truth 
and lying will derive their rightness or wrongness depending on the 
accrumen t of happiness : That is , each of these actions may b e  j udged 
right , even though some are consi�ered wrong , because each may bring 
happines s .  
I t  i s  not that Rand does not think that happines s is not valuab le , 
fo � as ! . pointed out earlie� she seemS to view its at tainment and the 
value o f  its at tainment on _a level with life itsel f .  Her criticism o f  
us ing happ iness as the s tandard o f  right and wrong als o  includes the 
implication that to exis tentially determine an action ' s  rightnes s  or 
wrongness , one mus t look for the presence of a sub j ective emotion . Rand 
believes that ethics mus t b e  based on more than either emotions or sub­
j ective des ire gratification for  it to guide people ' s  actions . She 
believes that what.is actually conducive to one ' s  life , that is , to the 
actual securement and betterment o f  one ' s  life , is an ob jectively 
answerable . questio n ,  and though one may give his opinio n on this is sue , 
. \  
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the op inion will in no way de termine the actual truth of the situation . 
Rand thinks that if happines s is  the standard , one will have no objec tiv� 
cri terion by whic� to dete rmine the rightness or wrongness of  an action . 
The se criticisms are des igned to show that there are problems 
that ari se if one uses an emo tion as the cri terion of righ t and wrong . 
I am inclined to agree that these can no t be forwarded agains t·a 
standard such as one ' s  lif e .  What makes me happy , may no t make John 
happy , but it does seem that if a certain situation is  conducive to my 
life that , other things being equal , it  will be to the advantage of  
John ' s  l ife also . This seems to be true in vir tue o f  the fact that John 
and I are both living human being . Therefore , if one can decide what 
things and ac tions further one ' s  life , then one knows that they are 
instrumentally ·good . It is the concept of intrins ic good
.
that makes 
.poss ible the concep t o f  extrinsic good . When Rand says that it is the 
4 
"task o f  ethic�. to teach {man ] how to live l ike man , ". she is re�err ing to 
the discovery of  and definition of  those extrin�ic goods which will promo te 
and ,  hopefully se cure the ultimate value , one ' s  life . 
Rand ' s  ph ilosophy declares that an organism ' s  l ife is "an ult i-
mate value • • • to which all lesser go als are the means--and it sets the 
s tanda+d by which all lesser are.evaluated . An organism ' s  life is its 
s tandard o f  value : that which. furthers, its life is  the good, that ·which 




Ibid . , pI 25. 
Ib id . , p • 17 • 
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A discussion of �hose life is intrinsically valuable is important 
at this point . The question arises whether (1) life in general , ap art 
from the l�fe of  the individual organism is the intrinsic value , or 
(2 ) each o rgan�sm ' s life is o f  intrinsic value t o  that organism, or 
( 3) all living entities are intrins ically valuable to each · other . 
Although Rand ' s  writ ings po int to the second of  these , she has not 
o f fered an.explicit and defended statement of  her position . I shall 
at temp t to supply this . Regarding the proposit ion ( 1 )  that life in 
general is the.intrinsic good , I must say that this makes little sens e 
to me . What is life apart from the individual living organisms ? Life 
is neither an entity nor a property , o f  a generality; it is a property o f  
single individual ent�ties . At any given time , l ife is p oss essed by 
ce�tain entit ies and·not by others . It is true that we have the concep t 
of  "life in general . "  This is shown by the many meaningful ut terances 
in:daily discourse ,  such as , "Life in general is p leasant for Ameri­
cans," or ,  "Life is a real has sle . "  The meaning o f  these utterances 
has to do with the quality of  life the maj ority of  certain people are 
experiencing at a certai� t ime . In o ther words , it is the no tion o f  
people ' s  lives that i s  at the heart of  the concept o f  "life in general . "  
By this I �ean that when a person makes reference to "life in general, " 
he means to re fer to the lives of people or of other animals ,  and to 
make some s tatement as to the quality of those lives . 
The Obj e ct ivist position is the same as mine that "life ," apart 
from the indivudual ent it ies that pos sess it , is no t a candidate for the 
intrinsic.good . The concep t of "life in general" seems to be analyzable 
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in terms of a number o f  individual living enti ties with regard to quality 
of  life this .number may have . 
Now what of the propos ition (2 ) that it is the individual ' s  life 
that is the intrins ic good relat ive to that particular organism? On 
this view my life is intrinsically valuable to me , a given horse ' s  life 
is intrinsically valuable to it , a given planaria ' s  life is intrins i­
cally valuable to it , etc . Rand ' s  writing indicates this interpretation 
is exp ressive of her po sition . This is because there is only one life 
that an individual can live : its own . What determines what is right 
to do in connection �ith the maintenance o f  an organism' s life ? Rand 
answers that the nature o f  the organism det ermines it : "A plant , "  she 
says , "must feed in order to live ; the sunlight , the water , the chemicals 
it needs are · the values its nature has set it to pursue ; its  life is 
the standard o f  value directions its actions . • it acts automatic-
ally to further ·its life , it cannot act for its own destruction . "
6 
This pass age clarifies the notion o f  intrins ic value , but it also 
creates a problem of facticity . Is it , or is it  not , true that plants 
cannot act for the ir own destruction? 'It must be remembered that .Rand ' s  
references to self-generated activity on the part o f  living organis ms 
are no t meant to be references to conscious goal-directed activity . I f  
this we re the case , then her s tatement would be trivially true since 
plants can not ac t consciously. She is s 4ying of the physical pro cesses 
6Rand , Atlas Shrusged , p .  1013. 
o f  organisms ranging from amoeb a through man in the Animal Kingdom and 
from algae to flowers in the Plant Kingdom tha t they do extend 
the organism ' s  li fe, or enab le it .. to l ive; and she is co rrec t. 
16 
The ac t ions o f.plants , as in the examp l e  above, do , on the who le , 
funct ion au tomati cally to sus tain the plant ' s  l ife . This is not to deny 
that, in ad dition , ce rt ain environmen tal condi t ions must be met accord­
ing to the kind of plant one is speaking of. The aerat ion of the soil, 
water and mineral c ontent o f  the so il, amount o f  sunl ight required, and 
freedom from certain . p arasite s  and fungi are required, for examp le� 
The que st ion, here, is whe ther it is proper to say that the 
o rganism ac ts for its own des truct ion , given some external environmen tal 
condition, such as chemical p oisoning of the soil the intake of which 
resul t s  in its death . In a sense i t  certainly can be said that the 
act ion of the p lant, that is, the o smo t ic pro ces s o f  taking the water 
from the s o il al so resul ted in the taking of poison which kil led i t. 
However, it i s  questionable that the osmotic process it sel f resul ts in 
the organism ' s death. This pro ce ss is ne ces sary to the survival of the 
plant. The fact that the poison killed the p lant in no way al ters the truth 
o f  the s tatemen t that the process functions, in o ther more favo rable 
condi t ions, to main t ain the life of the o rganism . It is known by 
b o ta�tsthat some plants are equipped with fil ter mechanisms which 
selectively ob s tru�t the p as s age into the p l ant . o f  certain parasi tes o r  
chemicals which could kill it. Other plants do not have the se fil ter 
device s. Is it to be thought that the l atter plants ac t for the ir own 
de s truct ion .because they do not have the filter mechanisms that o the r 
17 
plants do ? Is the inability t o  select which minerals are taken into its 
system the same thing as a plant's ·ac ting for its own destruction? The 
osmotic proce ss is one of  the processes . by which mos t ,  if  not all , plants 
survive . If a plant were to act for its own des truc tion , i t  would up­
set the process in some way . This is what I think Rand's point would 
be here . 
A further consideration of the problem is this : If it is no t the 
proce ss o f  osmosis that is responsible for the death o f  the plant , but 
the unfavorable environment ,  can it no t be said that the favorable 
conditions o f  an environment are responsib le for the �ife o f  the plant ? 
The answer is an emphatic , "No . "  The environment could be totally 
favorable for maintain ing plant l ife . However , unles s the processes of 
ingest ion , and metabolic reduction o f  food to energy , etc . , were present , 
the environment wo uld be p owerless to sustain a plant ' s  life . 
This que s t ion o f  whe ther a plant  ever acts for its own des truc -
· tion seems more and more to depend on how one chooses t o  des cribe the 
actual situation . Rand ' s  point , here , seems to be an accurate one in 
the sense that even if pois on is imbibed by.the plant ,  the process of  
o smosis was functioning according to cert ain . laws which if the process 
is executed in favorable conditions resul t in the plant ' s  continuing 
survival . The claim she makes can be s eparated from the amb iguity of  
language if one sees that Rand ' s  position see ms again · to import tele ol ogy 
to these processes when she speaks of "acting" for the plant ' s  destruct ion . 
Jus t  as nature dete rmines and eq uip s plants with values to pur­
sue , so she equips man with values . Unlike a plant ,  however ,  man is no � 
provided with an automatic course o f  activities which will gain his 
values . Nature provides him with a "voli tional consciousness . "  "Con­
sciousness-�for those living organisms that pos sess it--is the bas ic 
means of s urvival."
7 
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Rand ' s  s tatement above is arguable . For to claim that cons�ious­
ness is the basic means o f  survival , one must be able to show that it is 
more basic than, say , the ci tric acid cycle , or digestive pro cesses . I 
really do not think that this is a de fensible thesis . Man depends so 
greatly on unconscious pro cesses to live that to claim one to be more 
basic than another is a mis take . Both unconscious processes and con­
sciousness are basic to man ' s  survival . 
An acceptable and defensible thesis is that consciousne ss , for 
those organisms that possess it , is a basic condit ion of  survival . 
Be fore arguing for thi s pos ition I should like to say what I take the 
term " consciousness " to mean . 
Consciousnes s i s  a level of awareness found in some ani�als ,  and 
no t in other s .  It is more than the ability to respond to external 
s timul i ; i t  involves the awarenes s  of exte rnal stimuli . For example , 
this awarene ss of external stimuli provides man with an opportunity to 
respond before the actual phys ical st imulation . He can respond to 
symb olic cries such as , "Fire!" before he is burned . Anothe r example 
is that in a forest fire , the conscious animals can re treat , or , in man ' s  
case react  in such a way s o  as to
, 
put out the fire , before the actual 
7
Rand , The Virtue of Selfishness , p .  18 . 
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flames reach them� An amoeba or a planarium in a po nd can only respond 
to actual rising temperature of the wate r in such an instance .  Plants, 
in a l ike manner , and as examples of  unco nscious b eings , can only 
respond to the traumas of the enviro nment as they affect them directly. 
Whereas some animals can , because of cons cious awarene ss , respond be fore 
the actual physical co nfro ntation. 
Different clas ses of  animals display different levels of  aware­
ness . This indicates that consciousnes s can be.differentiated into 
higher and lower levels . However , the maj or importance. of-consciousness 
for the animals that pos se ss it  re sts on its importance as a means to 
as sess the environment .  Further , consciousness involves a level of 
awareness of one ' s  own inner states such as feeling hungry , cold , or 
sick. 
I agree with Rand that cons ciousness is a bas ic or neces sary 
condition of  life for higher or more comp lex animals . A dog , or a cat , 
a monkey,  or a man could no t survive on its own wi thout thi s s tate of 
awareness . 
For example , "there are records of  cases of  comatose patients in 
pos sib ly every ho spital . Their lives were , and are , maintained by the 
intrave nous feedings performed by others who pos sess this faculty of 
consciousness in its operative state . It does no t alter this fact to 
say that once the plasma , glucose , or blood , are administered that the 
patient takes over . The point is that the unconscious patient will die 
without the provis ions made poss ible by other conscious people . The 
fact that the patient ' s  body makes use of  the materials while he is 
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unconscious in no way diminishes the fact that his life depends on the 
food coming in. Further , the food is not coming in as a resul t of  a 
sel f-generated activity on the . part of  the patient . Unlike the plant  
who se osmotic proces ses provide it with water  automatically , and are 
sel f-generated processes , a comatose patient can use the water provided 
him , but can do nothing in the way of procuring it.  In order for a 
person to drink water , or eat food , he mus t be cons cious. In order for 
him to util ize these he need not be.  But if he is no t conscious , then 
he mus t depend on o ther cons cious p eop le to adminis ter the essential 
materi�s to him. Otherwise ,  he will die.  This does noe lead to the 
following conclus ion : That because · a comatose patient is  not self­
sufficient , no organism is self-sufficient because in bo th cases the 
food is provided by s omething external to itself . It leads to this 
conclus ion :  That an organism is dependent on its external environment 
and it s cons cious _ness o f  that environment to live. If the organism 
loses consciousnes s ,  then the organism is dependent on its environment 
and other conscious entities in order to live . In bo th cases it.is to 
be understood that . the entity in ques tion depends also in its own un­
conscious processes . There fore , cons ciousne ss remains a nec�ssary con­
dition .for its continued s urviyal . 
In a biologic sense , I do not think that there is any living 
entity that is s el f-sufficient in that it does no t require environmen tal 
elements , which it did no t create , to live . However ,  the point is not 
one of s elf- suf fic iency. It is a point that relates · to an entity ' s  
basic means o f  survival . When a person is unconscious , then his l ife 
comes to depend on the cons ciousness of others. If those others cease 
to adminis ter the neces sary food or drugs , the unconscious pers on will 
die ; unless , of  course , he regains conscious ness , and can adminster 
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these things to himsel f. The fact that it is conringent that the glucose 
is adminis tered by a nurse , rather than a computer programmed by a nurse , 
does not lessen.the force of  the fact that it is empirically true that 
consciousness is a bas ic means of s urvival for those entities that have 
it . Since it is necessary for the survival of many organisms. I am in 
agreement with Rand that it is a bas ic extrinsic good for those organ-
isms . 
8 ness? 
However ,  what is the meaning o f  the term 'volitiona1' cons ci ous-
Rand uses this term to make a dis t inction between man ' s  mode 
of cons ciousnes s  and other.animal ' s  modes of consciousness . With a few . 
exceptions in higher mammal ia ,  an animal 
• has no choice in the knowledge and-the skills that 
it acquires ; it can only repeat them generation after genera­
tion . And an animal has no choice in the s tandard o f  value 
directing its actio?s : it s senses provide it wi th an 
automatic code of values , an automatic knowledge of what is 
good for it or evi�what bene fi ts or endangers its life • •  
it cannot s uspend its cons ciousness--it cannot choose no t to 
perceive--it cannot evade its own perceptions . • • • �q has 
no automatic course of  action , no automatic set  o f  values . 
His senses do no t tell him automat ically what is good for 
him or evil, what wi�l bene fit his life or endanger it , what 
goals he should pursue and what means will achieve them. -
His own cons ciousness has to dis cover the answers to all of  
these ques t ions--� his consciousness will not  function 
automatically . • • · • Man ' s  sense organs funct ion automat ically ; 
8 Ib id . , p .  20 . 
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man's brain integrates his sense data into percepts automatically; 
but the process of[abstraction and of concept formatiorl is not 
automatic. • • • The faculty that directs this [ act�vely sustained] 
process • • •  is: reason. The process is thinking. 
In part, I think that Rand is mistaken here. Man does have senses 
which act automatically to deter a person from following certain courses 
of activity. The different physiological gag-reflexes, ,pain-avoidance 
reflexes, and the bit�er taste of some minerals usually function to 
deter a person from certain action�. Therefore, the flat assertion 
that man has no automatic course of behavior seems.to be false. Some 
forms of behavior are automatic. The contrary of Rand's position, i.e., 
all forms of knowledge are automatic, is false, too, so, with some 
qualifications, I would agree with Rand's account. It is true that·man 
does acquire knowledge by thinking, and in particular he acquires 
knowledge of values by thinking. For example, I saw.the mo ther of a 
newly-crawling baby girl save the child several. times from crawling off 
the bed. Then the mother put pillows around the bed. A few minutes 
later the baby crawled right off. Now before she fell the child could 
see the edge of the bed, and once at the edge, she could see the floor. 
She c�uld perhaps see that there was a c�nsiderable distance between the 
edge of the bed and the floor. However, the knowledge that was.not 
provided by her·senses was that she would fall if she crawled off the 
bed, and that·a fall could injure her. 
In Rand's description above of consciousness as a level of 
9 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
awareness regarding an organism ' s  environment and its internal s t ates, 
there was no attemp t to differentiate man ' s  cons ciousness from other 
animals ' cons ciousness . Rand does different iate between man and other 
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animal s, however. She maintains th at man ' s  consciousness has a property 
that mos t  higher animals do not have : The capaci ty to conceptual ize. 
Man ' s  consciousness shares with animals the firs � two levels 
of its development : . sensation's and percep tions: but �t is the 
third s tage, conceptions, that make·him man • • • •  But to integrate 
percep ti�ns in to concept ions by a process of ab s trac tion, 'is a 
feat that man alone has the power to perfo�-and he has to 
perform it by choice. The process of abs t�ac tion and concept-­
format ion is a process of reasol'lt of thought: it is no t . • 
ins tinc t ive, .nor involuntary, nor in fallible. Man has to 
initiate it, ·to sus tain it and to bear responsib ility for its 
results.lO 
It is this th�rd s tage that Rand re fers to as "voli tional . "  Rand 
main tains that thi s process of  comparing, contras ti�g, and reasoning does 
no t occur instinctively, nor automatically in man . 
I agree wi th Rand ' s  analysis of  cons ciousnes s  for the mo st part. 
However, an examination of certain cases may bring out some dif ficulties 
in thi� posi tion. 
It seems evident to ·me that there certainly is the kind of 
consc iousness Rand refers to . It is us ually called "re flect ive cons cious-
ne ss" and it seems to be an actively sus tained endeavor on the part of 
a person. Prob lem solving, drawing conclus ions from data, and scientific 
endeavo rs seem to exemplify the volitional aspect of directing one ' s  
at tent ion to X fo r certain purposes, !· 
10 
Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (New York : New American 
Li�rary, i9�) , p. 14. 
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However,  is reflective cons ciousness the only s ort o f  intellec­
t ive functioning? Are there no automatic intellective functions?  
Building houses , for  example , does not  seem to result from an automatic  
knowl edge of  how houses are built . The knowledge of how to build hous es 
seems to be a result of the reflect ive consciousnes s indicated above . 
There do , however , seem to be automat ic intellective functions in one 
sense , as can be seen in many examples . 
Cons ider a quite different example . Suppose that I am in a 
foxhole and.a l ive grenade is thrown into it . I certainly would not 
sit and re flect to myself about the presence o f  the grenade . I would 
snat ch it up as quickly as possible and throw i t , hopefully , out of  
dis tance of  harming me . However ,  .this . seems to be a response to a 
stimuli that I had knowledge of . · The process by which I gained this 
knowledge , however , s titl seems to· me t� be of �he reflective kind Rand 
refers to . Had I never learned that grenades killed people , I might 
have picked it up curiously , rather than throwing i t  o�t o f  the foxhole .  
It seems that many o f  our actions depend precisely on the kind o f  know­
ledge acquired through the kind of conceptual,endeavor Rand des cribes . 
Consider the proces s of  learning to play the piano . Firs t one 
must learn the names or sounds of  the particular keys or notes . Then 
he mus t  practice fingering exercises and s imple sc�les . Then one mus t 
coordinate the no tes into melodies. All of this takes a great deal of 
effort and is , unless a person is  unusually gifted , a very slow process . 
However there comes a t�me when the playing of the ·piano seems to be 
automat ic . I use the work "automatic " in the sense that the fingering 
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of keys does no t have · to be thought of  directly . One j us t  knows where 
his fingers go without having to contemplate it . If there is a sharp 
or a flat in the melody , it presents no problem to p lay . One does not 
have to reflect on the next measure of mus ic ; one j us t  plays it . One 
has not learned to play the piano without having attended to the elements 
of p iano playing, for the s truggles of learning to play show that it was 
no t automatic . However ,  over a period of time , the playing does become 
automatic in the sense specified . 
It certainly does seem that there is a kind of  thinking that . is 
not involun�ary , nor infallible , nor instinc tive . Whe ther or no� there 
are othe r kinds of thinking , kinds that are inst inctive , involuntary or 
infallible is an open que st ion which is outs ide the scope of this paper . 
It might be that there are such kinds o f  thinking, which may necess i-
tat� a qualification o f  Rand ' s  statement . However , this does no t seem 
to lessen the import o f  her statement concerning the kind o f  thinking 
heretofore dis cussed . 
It is  on the bas is of this kind o f  re flec tive thinking that Rand 
differentiates between man and o ther animals .  When Rand s ays that man's 
consciousnes s  mus t,dis cover the answers to the questions o f  what is good  
for  his life and what is  not , she is  speaking o f  the sum total of aware-
ness made pos s ible through sensations , percep tions , and reas oning. 
"Consciousnes s "  in man refers to all three of  these levels . As we shall 
see the concep tual level o f  consciousness is a mos t  impor tant  factor 
in Rand ' s  ethical posit ion . 
A being who does not know automatically what is true or false , . 
can no t know automatically what is . right or wrong, .what is go od 
, .. 
for him or evil . Yet he needs this knowledge in order to 
li ve • • 
·
• • That whl.ch his survival require s 
-
is set"by'his 
nature and is not open to his .choice . · What: is open to hii 
choice is onl y whether he will dis cover it or-not • • • •  1 
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Rand means to do three ·things in this s tatement . She firs t wants 
to impress the point that.man ' s  consciousness , consis ting o f  the three 
previous ly des cribed levels , can dis cover what things his survival 
requires .  This is a basic assump tion she makes . Secondly , she wants 
to show that this knowledge is crucial to his survival ; and , final�y ,  
she claims that.this discovery i s  open t o  a man ' s choice in s o  far as it · 
is conce ptual . 
Rand ' s  b iolog ical argumen t and her re ferences to b iological facts 
disclose that the life of a man , as well as of some o ther ani�als ,  de-
pends on �n operat ive aware �ess or cons ciousness .o f  both what his envir-
onment. affords him to live , and the means by whi ch that sustenance is 
to be gained .  In lower animals this process i s  largely a case ·o f  
ins t inctual behavior . In man it depends on the functioning of  all three 
levels of his awarenes s . Though it is true that the comato se patient 
+.ive s without his own operative consciousnes s , he could not l ive wi thout 
the -.perat±ve cons ciousness of some o the r human being who ref ills his 
glucose vials , removes his was te , and is conscious. 
As the ethical posit ion of  the Obj ect ivist  ph il9sophy maintains 
t�e life of  the organism is the intrinsic good , and those things which 
further life are the extrinsic goods , the ethi cal position conce rning 
11Rand , The Virtue of  Selfis hness , p .  22 . 
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cons ciousnes s  is that it  is a basic extrins ic good . This does not mean , 
however ,  that one always employs one ' s  consciousness in the c9urse o f  
one ' s  life t o  preserve one ' s  life .  Indeed , a man who co �its suicide 
by hanging himself, may conscio usly assemble a rope and a s too l for 
that purpose . 
In light o f  the view that in man the operation o f.his concep tual 
facul ty is under his volitional control , Rand fo rwards a prescriptive 
or normative claim as follows : To the extent that a person employs his 
capacity to reason in the furtherence of his life ,  he is doing as a 
human being should do . To the extent that he does not employ this 
capacity , or employs it in a way that is des truct�ve of his _own life ,  
he is not doing what a person ought to do . The fact  that reas oning and 
thinking are volit ional endeavors and that Rand sees these as capable 
of  funct ioning to main tain and preserve one' s life ,  the intrinsic go od , 
warran ts her prescrip tive claim. 
According to Rand , if man is to survive , he �us t "initiate" and 
1 2  "sus tain " () process o f  thought . 
He cannot provide for h is simples t phys ical needs without 
a process of thought. • • • His per�ept �  [ as opp os ed to his 
concep ts ] might lead him to a cav� if one is available--but 
to build the s implest shel te�he needs a process of thought.  
No percep ts , and no �nstincts' will tell hi� how to light a 
fire , how to weave cloth , • •  �how· to make a wheel, how to make 
an airplane , how to perform an -appende ctomy • • • •  Yet his life 
depends on such knowledge--and only a volitional act o f  his 
;consciousness , a process of thought , can provide it . l3  
1 2
Ibid . , p .  21 . 
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The range of knowledge necessary to do the above tasks varies 
tremendously from one to another . I think that the difference_in t hese 
14 achievements is largely . a dif ference in degree rather than kind . For 
example ,  the process o f  thought responsible for light ing a fire seems 
to turn on the ability to isolate or recognize certain materials , viz�, 
chert or fl int , and to realize their sparking effects on other materials , 
dry wood fo r example . On the other hand , it is obvious that the per-
formance of an appendect omy has required several centuries or more to 
perfect . The contributions to the succe ss of such an operation are 
probably innumerable . The complexity of  knowledge , gained by many 
dif ferent men in dif ferent pursuits , does not lend itsel f to easy 
analysis in terms o f  the "process of  thought " Rand a scribe s  to it . 
Ho wever , despite the complexity, it does seem evident that though the 
channels leading to the success ful performance o f  an appendectomy are 
varied and ob scure , and spread over years , the facul ty that makes it 
po ssiQle is the cognitive , reasoning facul ty both in the man who perfo rms 
the operat ion and in his pre dece ssors who developed the technique . 
I t  is at on ce conceded by me , if not by Rand , that there are 
people who do survive with a minimum of technology . The Australian 
abor igine and the Phillip ine Tasaday , for example . But could they sur-
vive wi thout a con stant proces s  of thought ? By-this I mean would they 
live without assessment of their environments , without their ston� 
implements for hunting or cooking , wi thout shelter , or knowledge of  
medicinal herbs ?  Even the simplest  means o f  living seems to depend 
partly on man ' s ability to reason . 
14 Ib id . , p .  2 0 . 
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Rand argue s , then , that man can choose whether to think or not . 
What , then , de termines whether or not a man will think? Rand answers : 
a man ' s will . She compares a man ' s  consciousness , specifically his 
reasoning faculty , to a "machine without a spark plug , a machine of  
which [ one ' s ] own will has to  be the spark plug ,  the self- starter , and 
the driver ; he has to discover how to use it , and he has to keep it in 
cons tant action . "
15 
"The will " is a very complex philo sophical . concept , 
giving rise to a hos t o f  problems . I do not think it is self-evident 
that it is a man ' s  will which determines whether he will think or con-
cep tualize . But I think examples no t involving the concept o f  will can 
be cited as instances of  what . Rand .means . Suppose , for example , that I 
eat mushrooms to live on . Suppose that every third day I ge t violently 
il l from certain mushrooms , but I don ' t  know which ones . All I do know 
is that some days mushrooms make me sated , and that other days they make 
me very sick . If I don ' t  care whether I feel well or not , perhap s I 
won ' t  go any fur ther in my knowledge · than this . But what if being sick 
makes me care ? If s o ,  I mus t try to find out . what . causes this s tate of 
affairs . I may j ump to all the wrong conclus ions ; for example , I may 
link the sick feeling to the way I handle the mushrooms· or s tore them . 
When these efforts fail , perhap s I may discover a dif ference between . 
the mushrooms ' odor , coloring , or whatever that shows me that whenever 
I eat mushroom A type I feel fine , whereas mushroom � type mak� s me 
sick . 
The reflective examination involved in this example revolves 
l S  Ib :l. d • , p • 2 2 • 
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around two things : One is the des ire not to be sick from mushrooms any 
longer . This is  part of  the pleasure-pain mechanism found in mo st 
people . Sicknes s is unpleas ant . But the desire to di scover what and 
why I am get ting sick s eems to be more than a reflex to avo id pain or 
dis comfort . Rand would say that my e f fort s  to under stand are mani fes­
tat ions of  my will . Although the case under discus s ion is a clear exam­
ple , and self-explanatory , I am st ill no t convinced that it is proper 
to speak of  a "faculty of will , "  nor am I sure j us t  what this facul ty is 
like . Fur ther , I am not sure that an act o f  choice is the sufficient 
condition of such reflective thinking . To be sure , it  seems as though 
learning o f  this kind , or the refusal to participate in learning o f  this 
kind , is controlled by a person ' s  des ire or "will " to learn or no t to 
learn . But I am inclined to think that one ' s  environment also has a 
good bit  to do with the init i�l impetus to make . this choice . For 
exampl� , tribes o f  Eskimos are . known to have over two do z en words for 
"snow , " each des ignating a particular kind of snow according t<? color , 
texture , and implications for hunting and fishing . This clas si fica­
tion is importan� for the Eskimos due to the fact that snow is a con­
stant aspect o f  their lives . As it is no t important environmentally 
that I have the different classifications of snow on hand , it has never 
occurred to me to attemp t such a classif ication . Were I to put my mind 
to such a task however , I think that I would be success ful . However , 
phrases such as "will , "  "personal decis ion , "  "put ting my mind to it , "  or 
"des ire " do not suf �iciently explain the initiating and sus taining of 
my reasonable thinking which , in . the example above , would consis t of 
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comparing , contras ting , and devoting my at tention to snowfalls .  Unfor­
tuna�e ly ,  Rand ' s  metaphor of the spark p lug is al l that. she has written 
on the subj ect of the will . I would only be second-guess ing to say what 
her view of the wil l  is , and tearing down a s traw-man if it were no t what 
I thought it should be . Perhap s the only acquaintance I have with such · 
a capacity is through introspection . If  this can be allowed as evidence 
fo r the seat , of  vo lit ion then I can say I know - what Rand is speaking o f ,  
t�ough I cannot s ay how to analyze it . 
In this chap ter I have tried to present and evaluate Rand ' s  posi­
tion concerning the intrinsic good , i . e . , the life o f  such organism, 
and a bas ic means to life for some organisms , i . e . , . cons ciousness . At 
this p oint I should like to move to other derivative extri�sic goods 
in Rand ' s  philosophy . Chapter I I  will deal wi th Obj e �tivism' s conten­
tion that productive action , reason , pride , and self�es teem are values /  
virtues . The examinations o f  the meanings o f  each o f  thes e  terms and 
their consistency with her foundational premiss wi ll be the main 
obj ective in the chapte r .  
CHAPTER II  
THREE CARDINAL VALUES AND VIRTUES 
Some questions that can be as ked in connectio�. with values are : 
What are values ?  Does man need values ? If he does , why ? Where does 
the concep t of  "value " originate ? 
To begin with the las t ques tion , · Rand says th�t th� concep t o f  
"value " originates in the irri tability o f  an organism , i . e . , the ab ility 
to respond to the sensations of pleasure and pain. She writes : 
The cap acity to experience pleasure or pain is innat� 
in a man ' s  b ody : it is part · of his .nature, . .  pa1:t .o f . the kind 
of entity he is • • • , The pleasure/pain mechanism in . the body o f  man 
\ • ! serves as an automatic guardian . of  the organismr s life . 
The phys ical sensation o f  pleasure is a .s ig nal .indicating that 
the organism is pursuing .the right course .of ·. action . The 
physical sensation of  pain . is a warning signal of danger , 
indicating that fge organism is pursuing the wrong course 
of  action . • • • 
Rand thinks that the concept of "value " originates in . the ability to 
feel and respond to pleasure and pain . But what are these "automatic 
guardians " eicact
.
ly ? Rand has specified several times that , unlike other 
animals , man does no t have instinct ,  wh�ch I would think would serve as 
an .  ' 'automatic guardian " in some respects . Even ins tinct is not · a guard-
ian in the sense that it guarantees the survival o f  the animals that have 
it . Fo r examp le , the migration ins tinct in b irds does help them survive 
hard winters ,  but it does not insure a safe flight to the warmer climate . 
16Ibid . , PP • 17-18 . 
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The pleasure /p ain mechanism, l ike instinct ,  is automatic . It also 
serves as a guardian in the sense that it does help to provide some 
safety for the organism. Unlike instinct , however ,  the pleasure /pain 
mechan ism works only when , in fact , specific  kinds o f  physical conforn­
tation is experienced . For example , if I put my . hand on the burner of 
a hot s tove , I will wi thdraw my hand in pain . I do no t have an ins tinct 
te lling me no t to put it there in the firs t place. Rand is correct in 
ci ting cases of  children who were born without this capacity not sur­
viving very long , for they are unab le to · assess . their envi ronments and 
the relation their environments have to their own. bodies . Suppo se that 
one did no t have the capacity to experience . pleasure. or pain . If one 
b rok� his leg , one would feel no pain . One might l�t it  go unat tended , 
and perhaps contract blood p9isoning and die . The p leasure /pain mechanism 
gives a person an instant asses sment by way of sens ation and react ion to 
' his own environment ,  and to his own internal stat�s . If the pleasure/ 
pain mechanism is an indication that . a man is following the right or 
wrong course of action ,respectively , then it might be · asked if he needs 
any thing mo re than these indicators , and in particular why he needs 
in tel lection?  
It · is a fac t that this mechanism can be controlled by  a man ' s  
rational faculty , and , in some cases , it is such control that saves a 
person ' s  l ife . Suppose ,  for example , that a person is le ft in the snow 
and upon being res cued his feet show s igns o f  gangrene . · All of the 
nerves in his fee t  are dead ; there is no pain . However , he knows that 
gangrene is fatal if left unattended ; therefore , he submits to both the 
pain of having his feet removed , and the discomfort of  recovering slowly , 
in order to live . During the operation the p leasure /pain mechanism is 
going to b e  signaling that the man is "pursuing the wrong course o f  
action . "  However , if  it i s  his life that - will b e  s aved , then he is 
purs uing the right cours e of  action in overriding that signal . 
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Therefore , I would s ay that if a person is cons cious , not s edated , 
and pos s esses the p leasure/pain mechanism, then this mechanism s erves 
automatically on many occas ions ; but not all , to assess the relation 
exis ting be tween the phys ical environment and one ' s  body .  It can and 
should be entirely ignored on some occas ions . For in some cas es reason 
mus t _ guide one ' s  actions toward the preservation . of. one ' s  li fe . In many 
cases pleasure and pain . do indicate that the organism is following the 
right or  wrong course of  action . There fore , on the occasions that it  
is  reliab le ( and these occasions far outnumb er those on  wh ich it  is  
no t ) , the pleasure/pain mechanism is  an extrins ic good . 
One prob lem with Rand ' s  treatment of  the pleasure/p ain mechanism 
involves the word "s ignal . "  The operation of the mechanism involves , I 
t�ink , two separab le occurrences : the s timulus and the response . 
Although it is difficul t to tell experientally where the s timulus 
begins and ends and the response begins and ends , it  is phys iologically 
explicable through di�grams o f  afferent and efferent neurophys iological 
nerve networks . It is evident to me that Rand regards the pleasure/ 
pain mechanism in a way that includes both the ab ility to transmit 
sensory input , and the ab ility to respond t� that input . The word 
"signal" is unfortunate becaus e it can be taken to mean only the sens a-
. tion , exclus ive o f  the response . I think , however ,  that Rand intends to 
include both the s timulus and the response as the "automatic guardian . " 
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I f  the concept . o f  "value" originates in the ability to experience 
pleasure and p ain , what are values , and why does man need them? We 
have s een that the pleasure/pain mechanism helps the organism to s urvive . 
This is why it is o f  value . Other values , in a like manner ,  are als o 
that whj,ch help an organism to survive . Rand says that values are "that 
17 which one organism seeks to gain and or keep . " · In . b iologic terms, values 
are those things nature sets an . organism to pursue , or. ac tions it sets 
ari organism to perform which resul t  normally in the . maintenance of  its 
li f e .  It  seems t o  be the case that man , unlike mos t animals , faces 
alternatives which his _ b iologic nature does not help him to decide 
between . Rand . des cribes this situation as one of having "no automatic 
course of action" ( Cf .  p .  21) . We have s een ,  however , that there are 
some kinds of automatic behavior , . such as pain-avoidance . There are 
also behavior patterns in infants which are common . What I think Rand 
is sugges ting here is that whereas . ins tinct promp ts the migration o f  
b irds , if har4 winters come upon man , instinct does no t tell him where 
to go or what to do . The closes t res emblance to an ins t inct apparatus 
in man seems to be the pleasure/pain mechanism .  Through this mechanism 
certain ac tions are effected as in the withdrawal response from fire 
when being burned . ·  However , instinctive behavior takes place before the 
winter sets in , whereas the pleasure/pain mechanism is arous ed only in 
the pre sence of the actual s timuli . In view of  this Rand says that man 
17 Ib id . , p .  15 . 
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"needs a code of  values to  guide his act:ions . "  To guide his actions 
to what ? Rand would answer--to the maintenance of the person ' s  life . 
Jus t as some actions may endanger the org anism , so others may encourage 
the securement of his life . A code of  values is needed to provide man 
with a way to know which actions are good in . so  far as they help secure 
the ultimate value . 
This is not to say that all values presuppose . a cons cious re cogni-
tion . In mos t  ins t�nces , a code o f  values , . conscious ly arrived at , 
presupposes the need o f  such a code . · Obvious ly - the . values in different 
societie s differ , s ome being more explicitly set out in law and cus tom 
than o thers , and some being mo re consciously and. purposefully arrived 
at than o thers . Rand � s  assertion that a code of . values is needed by man 
· means that in . the face · of  alternatives (which men face no mat ter what 
society they come from , nor how advanced the society is)  men need and can 
be helped by a code o f  values . A person does no t usually worry ab out 
which alternative course of action to choose unless the decis ion is upon 
him. If there were no alternatives , then a code o f  values would probably 
no t even be thought of . 
At this point  Rand introduces two sub-principles which she 
supports by re ference to man ' s  nature : "Since everything man needs has 
to be discovered by his own mind and produced by his own effort , the 
two essent ials of the method of survival proper to a rational being are : 
thinking and product ive work . "19 
18 Rand , Atlas Shrugged , p .  1012 . 
19 Rand , The Virtue of Selfishness , p .  2 3 .  
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In the firs t place i t  seems plainly false that everything man 
needs mus t b e  dis covered by his _ own mind and produced by his own effort . 
Man needs his autonomic nervous sys tem,  but this need never have been 
dis covered by his own mind , and it  is certainly not produced by his own 
effort . What is dis covered is that he needs i t .  The discovery .that . he 
needs air , or water , or food does not mean that one did no t need them 
be fo re the discovery . Further , what _ is  produced by his own effort?  It 
is obvious that he needs many . things which he does not produce . Air 
and water are things he needs , but it does no t seem. that _ he produces 
them . This p art of  her s tatemen t wou�d be better . i f  it . were revised to 
say that many things man needs to live mus t be discovered by his own 
mind and procured by his own effort . By "effort�' Rand means action of 
a certain type . It seems , for example , that i f  I. hunt for my food , I 
have discovered that I need food and that certain actions on my part will 
or will not be commensurate wi th my procuring it . 
Both in her fictional writing and her ess ays Rand indicates that 
" a  method o f  survival" and a "method o f  survival proper to man" are two 
different no tions . But why should one method of  survival be more proper 
than ano ther? Does the difference bo il down to one of  attempt versus 
one of  success ? The answers l ie in the intrins ic value , l ife , and the 
means or methods employed by men to secure it . It has already been 
shown that man ' s  consciousness--cons ist ing o f  three levels--is crucially 
importan t  to his · life . · The dif ference · in " the metho d of survival proper 
to man" and the mere "method o f  survival" is that the former includes 
the interrelated func�ioning of all three levels ; whereas , the latter 
relies on a method cons isting p rimarily o f  sensation--percep tion , 
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without in it iat ing and sus taining the cognit ive or reasoning cap acity . 
Concep t format ion , comparing , contras ting , integrating the material pro-
vided by one ' s  senses and pe�cep t ions are the sour ces from which p rac ti-
cal knowledge comes . A man could never tell the dif ference between a 
pois onous mushroom and a non-po isonous one , no r the dif ference between 
good water and b ad . wat er , no r any . o f  the many co�existing goods and 
ills he might s tumb le upon i f  he did no t make use o f  the cogni tive 
reas on ing l evel . The result of this would be a huge j ump in the mor tal= 
ity rate , which has declined so enormously . due to the us e o f  reason . 
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" In ancien t Rome the average . l ife span was· twenty- five years . "  The 
fac t that the increas e in the l ife span is p artly a Tes ul t  o f  a decrease 
in . the in fant mo rtality rate does not alter the fac t that what is 
responsible for the de crease in the infant . mor t ality rate is the expand-
ing �owledge o f  man . Man did no t gain . th i s  knowledge through mere 
percep tion and sens ation , but through the exercise o f  his reasoning 
cap ac ity. 
Rand ' s  reason for s t re s s ing the impor tance . o f  thinking res ts on 
the fact that i f  man does not . think ; his odds of survival decrease . It 
seems that if l i fe is the int rinsic good and if the re are methods bo th 
p rope r  and improper , the grounds on which one is j udged proper , and the 
o thers improp er , l ies with the fact that . .  the proper me thod tends to in-
crease the length o f  l i fe , whereas the improper metho ds do not tend to 
achieve this and perhaps de ter it . The mean ing o f  "proper" would b e  
"having the best results in so far as main taining an en t i ty ' s  l i fe . "  
20
"Li fe , Length o f , "  World Book Encycl opedia , 19 49 , X ,  4439 . 
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What o f  the other es sential : "p roduct ive work" ? I think the 
phrase "product ive ac tion" conno tes a wider range o f  ac tivities than 
"work . "  Hence , I will use it in l ieu o f  "work . "  Produc tive ac tion is 
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co-ne ce ss ary with reason to enable a man t o  l ive . I could thin� to my-
sel f , " I  am s t arving"; however ,  without an active lo como t ion o f  my bo dy 
toward the pro curement of food , I would go righ t  on s tarving . Jus t as 
sen s at ion wi ll ini tiate the though t ,  " I  am hungry , � · thinking wi l l  pro-
vide , or at temp t to . provide one wi th a solut ion , such as , "I will go 
ki ll tha t  deer and e at it . "  Upon . dec iding what course o f  ac tion to 
pursue , one ' s  efforts directed to that course o f . ac tion mus t be con-
comitant for survival . This doe s not di ffer in kind from many . anfmals ' 
behavio r .  However , this does no t ·negate the fact that product ive action 
is an . es sen tial p ar t  of the ab ility fo r man to l ive . Rand as serts that 
reas on and product ive · action help to maintain and better man ' s l ife , and 
should be utilized to the fulle s t  po s s ible exten t  compat ible wi th main-
tain ing life . 
For those who do no t emp loy the se means , howeve r ,  Rand s ays qui te 
frankly that . their only mean s to maintain life is to rely on or try to 
cont rol o the.rs whose efforts to live emb race these essent ial me tho ds . 
Rand is wrong , howeve r , in some o f  he r s tatements conce rning tho se 
who refuse to. think and act produc tive ly . She say s , "sucq looters and 
p arasites are incapable of survival , who exi s t  by de s troying those who 
21 are capable , "  i . e . , tho s e  who think and act productive ly . Now clearly 
21Rand , . The Virtue o f  Selfishness , . p .  2l . 
such loo ters and paras ites do survive . Further she is too simplis tic 
when · she s ays that they "are attemp ting to survive by the methods of 
22 
animals , "  i . e . , mere perception--sensation . Many . such loo ters , the 
confidence-man fo r example , certainly plans and thinks and follows his 
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plans . Also ,  to go on to say that they · "cannot survive by attempting the 
method o f  animals ; by rej ecting reas on and count ing on _product ive � to 
2 3  serve a s  their prey" i s  only true if  the men . who s erve as their prey 
stop that service . She is on stronger ground , empirically speaking , when 
she s ays : " I f  some men attemp t to survive by means of brute force or 
fraud , by loot ing , robb ing ; cheating or enslaving the men who produce , 
it s till remains true that their survival is made poss ib le only by their 
victims . Rand claims : 
Man ' s  mind is  his basic tool o f  survival . Life is given 
to him, survival is not . His b ody is given t o  him , .its 
sus tenance is not . His mind is given to him , its content 
is not .  To remain alive , he must act , and before he can ac t 
he mus t  know the nature and the purpose o f  his actions • • • •  
To remain al ive he mus t  think . 25 
Here , again , Rand is stres sing the ext rins ic value of thinking and pro-
ductive action . However , there is one claim made in this s tatement that 
seems to be mis taken . It is that before a man can act he must know the 
nature and the purpose of his action . Perhaps it is true that actions 
taken by men who do not know the purposes of their ac tions are not as 
2 2 Ibid . , p .  23 . 
23
Ib id . , p .  2 4 . 
24 Ib id . , p .  23 . 
25 Rand , Atlas Shrugged , p .  1012 . 
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e ffective , in terms of maintaining one ' s  life , �s actions whose purposes 
are known .  But i t  does not seem that one 11mus t"  know the nature and the 
purpose o f  one ' s  actions in order to ac t .  The sentence concerning on� ' s  
mind and its content means for Rand that the ability to learn , think , 
and perceive , are given . to man , but the things that he ac tually will 
learn , think , or perceive are , for the most part , developed through his 
own life and by his own effort . 
I think that Rand ' s  arguments that r·eason . and. product ive ac tions 
are extrins ically good follow from her p remiss that one ' s  life is the 
intrinsic good . Hence , I accep t these · claims . 
The prob lem is no t so much that Rand argues for p roductive action 
and reason as two cardinal values as it is that she . argue s agains t o the r 
methods o f  survival . This is seen in her analogy o f . the loo ters and the 
paras ites . At th�s point I should like to cons ider these me thods that 
· Rand argues are improper to . the survival of man . Rand employs a classi­
fication in which she describes three methods of awareness . It mus t be 
rem�mbered that Rand claims t�at concep tual awarene ss is vo litional . If 
this is true , then man can (and according to Rand doe s)  function erratic� 
ally , that is , on one level of  awarenes s  at one time , and on another 
level . o f  awareness at ano ther t ime . For Rand , the quest ion of whethe r 
one is go ing to be able to live hi s life utiliz ing reason and productive 
action .depends on the method o f  awareness one utilizes the mo st . 
Rand suggest s the following gene ral classification on the bas is 
o f . a person !. s dominant method of awareness . . The first label that she 
employs is " the Mys t ic . "  A person : whose dominant method o f  awareness is 
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"mys tic " does not relate his ab s tractions , feelings , or emotions to 
reality . The second label she employs is the "Atilla . "  The person 
whose dominant -method of  awareness is "Atilla" is described as _ one 
"whos e  brain is a j umble of concretes , unintegrated by abs trac tions " 
and who sees . all things within h�s immediate perceptual view as obj ects 
to either be - feared or manipulated at his every whim . "Bo th are · 
guided and mo tivated--ultimately--not by thought s ,  _but by feelings and 
whims . "
26 
Rand .defines � ''whim" as "a desire experie y a person 
� ���-.. u ... lilfPW>"'�...r""'""'�.-
..... . . ..,.,,.,,....._.o:.·-� . -
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who does not know apd · oes not care to discove " That 
one can discover the causes of one ' s  desires is a philosophic assump tion 
,. 
of Rand ' s  sys tem.  The third method o f  awareness _ is labeled the 
"Producer . "  This method consists of comparing and examining the world 
around one , forming a consistent view in ac�ordance with the reality 
one perceives , and acting in accordance with that view . Rand says 
that this is the method of awareness tha t _ enables man to improve the 
odds of his survival . The label "Producer " includes the process of 
conceptual thinking which was discussed earlier . 
Let us examine in particular the method� "Mystic" and "Atilla" 
in order to see what is involved in them , and whether there are such 
�inds of awarenesses , and , if there are , whether or nut they are improper 
given Rand ' s  basic premiss . 
I intend to use Zen Buddhism to clarify what Rand designates as 
the "Mys tic" mode · o f  awarenes s . Rand describes a person as . a "mysti�u. 
26Rand , For the New Intellectual , p .  19 . 
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Rand , The Virtue o f  Self ishnes s ,  p .  14 . 
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when . his dominant mode of awareness "obl iterate[ s ] the distinction between 
cons ciousness and reali ty , between the perceiver and the perceived , 
hoping that an automatic certainty and an infall ible knowledge of  the 
universe will be granted to him . • The des ire. for an in fal lib le 
knowl edge of the Universe is not to be condemned . Philosophers and 
o ther men have searched for thi s throughout recorded- history . However ,  
whereas the philosopher . employs conceptual thinking to gain knowledge , 
the "mys tic" at tempts to gain it by the purging of the intelle ct . Tqe 
"unshakable conviction that there is something indeed going beyond mere 
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intellect ion" is an accompaniment of  this endeavor t o  seek a higher 
reality or a truer truth than that whi ch is afforded by reas on , logic , 
and conceptual data . Inherent in Zen , and pos s ibly in all other kinds 
o f  mys ticism ,  is the distrust and consequent denial of the acceptab ility 
of rat ional explanation fo r acquiring this truth . "True knowledge 
(bodhi) t ranscends all modes of expression .  In · Zen , there is noth-
30 ing to explain by means of word s • • • , " · Logic , which encompasses all 
�o rms of  conceptual ex�rcis� , COJ!lparing , contras ting , reasoning , etc . is to 
be purged from the mind as it is the "b ane of  humanity . "
31 
The efforts 
to purge the mind sometimes take the fo rm of koans , one of  the mos t  
famous o f  which is : -"You have heard the sound o f  two hands clapping : 
28
Rand , For the New Intellectual ,. p .  17 .  
29 
D .  T .  Suzuki , An Introduction . to · Zen Buddhism (New York : Grove 
Pres s ,  · rnc . , 1964) , p .  109 . 
30
Io id . , p .  49 .  
31 Ib id . , p .  69 . 
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What is  the sound of one hand? " . Supposedly , this . kind. of .. s tatement is 
able to help a person achieve a receptive frame of mind for enlighten-
ment o r  "satori" by negating the process of rationaliz ation . 
Wo rds are regarded as fet ters , reasoning power as chains , and 
concep tualization as a dungeon which tie man · to an imperfect and uncer-
tain knowledge . According to Zen , perfect knowledge. consists in find-
32 
ing "a new viewpo int for looking into the essence of things . "  This 
viewpoint reveals that "sd.lence and eloquence become identical , that .is , 
h 33 w ere negation and assertion are unified in a higher form of statement , "  
where ! is non-! and contradictions exis t .  The illogical and irrational 
I 
is proclaimed to have a higher truth "which is in correspondence with 
the true state o f  things . "  
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From an intellective and logical point of view this is not in 
correspondence with the true state o f  things at all .  Thi s i s  what Rand 
means when she says that when and if the "insights " o f  the "mys tic ·, ' ! 
whi�h are produced by the ' emp tying o f  consciousnes� · "clashes with 
35 
reality ,  it is reality that he ignores . "  Reality , in this sense , is 
not to be confused with the "higher reality" the "myst ic"  strives for . 
From this explanation it is clear that Rand ' s  metaphys ical as sump t ion is 
that reality is knowable through one ' s  intellective reasoning power , 
32 Ib id . , P •  88 
33
Ib id . , p .  70 . 
34
Ib id . , P •  60 . 
35Rand , For the New Intellectual , p .  17 . 
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that it is the us e of this capacity that makes real knowledge possible . 
Further , Rand considers the kind o f  "insight " achieved through the 
purging o f  one ' s reason will , far from co rresponding to the true s tate . 
of  things , be a . di s tortion o f  the true s tat e o f  things . 
This metaphysical position is an old one , · and- has much to be said 
both for and agains t it . However ,  for the purpo ses of this thesis it is 
necessary only to recognize it as an assumption . on Rand ' s  part . What 
is important in Rand ' s  view is whe ther or not an awareness such as is 
employed by Zen would or  would no t help one in his- endeavor to survive . 
The second mode of  awareness in need o f  investigation is that o f  
"Atilla . "  It is characterized by a concern only . with the immediate 
momen t and how to get through it . Rand says , "An Atilla � • •  thinks 
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only of taking over . "  . He "regards a fis t , a club , . or a gun , as the 
only answer to any problem .  The modern paradigms o f  such a 
level o f  awareness are the bank robber , blackmailer , murderer ,  or kid-
napper . The "Atilla'' · mode of  awarenes s expresses itself in phys ical 
force and/or force by guile "Atilla feels no need to unders tand , to 
explain , nor even to wonder how men manage to produce things he cove ts--
"somehow" is a fully ·satisfactory answer . • • • All he needs , his 
"urges" tell him ,  is bigger muscle s , bigger club s , or  a bigger gang than 
theirs in order to seize their bodies and their products , after which 
their bodies will obey his commands and will provide him , somehow , with 
the s at is faction of any whim. "
38 
36 Ibid . , p .  16 
38 Ib id . , p .  16 . 
37  Ibid . ,  p .  14 .  
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The ''Mystic" mode of awareness result$ in a feeling o f  dis gust 
fpr practical reality ; and the "Atilla" method of awareness results in 
an inab ility to view his life long range . Tile former "pro fesses scorn 
for material property , for wealth , for man • s  body , for . this earth • • •  
[while the other ] professes scorn for values , ideals , theories , abs trac-
tions • •  The two archetypes come to depend . on . each other . 
"Atilla" seeks re fuge from an incomprehensib le universe , and the "myst ic " 
40 
seeks refuge from a "physical reality . "  Examp les of  such a collabora-
tion are numerous in his tory : the priests of  anc ient Egypt saying 
whether the "omens" are right for Pharoah to attack , or the warriors ' 
listening for the advice of the Oracle at Delphi , or the members o f  the 
Manson family waitng for the j ust ification of - killing an entire house-
hold of " sinners" are 'j ust a few examples . 
Perhaps another kind of  example will help gain the point that men 
are erratic in their methods of  awarenes s , as well as explain Rand ' s  
meaning in d is t inguishing these three categories . In a dis cuss ion of  
any sort where divergent opinions are · being asserted , if you have ever 
wanted to force your view on your adversary , rather , than persuade him of  
its truth , goodness , plaus ib ility , et c . , then you have experienced the 
"Atilla" urge of conquest . In a like manner , if you have · ever refused to 
be questioned about , or refused to question , belie fs or tenets you hold 
on the grounds that fac t s  are · not relevant to their truth or falsity , or 
that words are · o f  no use in discussing beliefs ,  then you have stood 
where the men - that Rand calls "myst ics " stand . 
39 
Ib id . , p .  20 .  
40  Ibid . , p .  19 • 
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In both cases these men ignQre reason , logic , facts , discus sion , 
and exchange o f  ideas . Is this to say that they do no t think? It is 
not .  Rand admit s  that 
• they can and do--but thinking, to them, .is . no t a 
means o f  perceiving reality , it is ·a means . . o f . jus tifying their 
escape from the necessity of rational percep tion . : • . • •  Jus t 
as a bank . robber will spend years of  . planning ; . ingenuity , and 
e ffort in order to prove to himself �that .he .can . .  exist .without 
effort , so both Atilla and the Wit ch .Doctor .. will· . .  go . to . any 
leng th o f  cunning , calculation , and thought . in order . to 
demons trate the impotence of  thought and .preserve . the image 
of a pliable universe where miracles · are po ssible and whims 
are efficacious . 41 
I think that two points need to be made he�e • . . Firstly , I do not think 
that a bank robber tries to "prove" to himself tha.t he can . exist without 
ef fort . This is more o f  a psychological quest ion than an ethical one . 
It seems that he seeks to find ways to exist without . the effort of  
honest work , and in finding a way he . proves to . himsel f that he can 
exist without effo rts of  hones t  work . Secondly , . the . que stion arises of 
whether or not a rational man will go to any lengths in order to prove 
that th� universe is . rat ional . On Rand ' s  view of this , any man who go es 
to the length of distorting his own percep tions , or distorting his con-
ceptual j udgement s  in order to make them fit a des ired end , rather 
than to arrive at them in view of· the facts h.e has apprehended 
or -..di_scovered will be a "mys t ic , " no mat ter whether he is  
t rying to prove that the universe is  rational acco rding to his own image 
o f  rationality , or  irrational . The key element in Rand ' s  discus sion 
4 1Ibid . , p .  19 . 
of the "Mystic" mode of awareness is the distortion that is employed ,  
and the contradictions that resul t  from it . 
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I hope that th� di fferences and the similarities between the modes 
of  awareness o f  the "Mystic" and the "Atilla" are clear . I believe that 
this classification can be usefully applied to normal people , that is , 
to t�o se whose brains are no t damaged ,  and who are not .. mentally ret arded . 
The re are other ways of  unders tanding a person ' s  behaviQr . Psycholo­
gist s and . psychiatrist� have their own special ized . language to deal with 
th� behavior o f  people . Rand ' s  clas sification is . in line with the po si­
tion that it is man ' s  reason , not his whims or  feelings that is a basic 
necessary condition o f  his life in that it is the means by which we can 
learn what actions do and do no t promot� our l ives • . 
These metho ds of  awarenes s  are impo7;tant in Rand ' s ethics , and ,  
although they have been severely critized , I d o  not think that analys is 
of Rand ' s  ethics would be complete without a dis cus sion of this cl ass ifi­
cation . For it  is implicit in her philosophy that all progress on 
Earth , that is , all gradual betterment o f  the quality and length o f  life 
that men have undergone , has been due to the use , however sporadic , o f  
his conceptual and reasoning capacity . O f  the three me thods Rand 
describes only the "Producer" employs this ability to its fullest  extent 
capable wi th maintain life , and in a way which help s to secure life 
(Cf . p .  2 7 ) .  
I think that at this point Rand can only try to show that the 
"Mys tic" mode of awareness is an improper method of awareness . She can-
not , as far as I can tell , argue that the "At illa" mode is imp roper at 
thi s po int . In Chap ter III we shal+ discus s why the outcome o f  an 
"At illa" awareness is improper , fo r this method and its resul t s  are 
d irectly concerned with h�r theo ry of obl igation . 
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I think that Rand can legit imately argue that a "Mys tic" mode o f  
awarenes s . i s  improp er on the fo llowing grounds : the . consequences o f  a 
"Mys tic" mo de o f  awarene s s  are such that . if I had . to . rely on the "know­
ledge" acquired by it as a guide for my action s , my odds of survival 
would d imin ish cons iderab ly . Fo r even if contradic tions can exis t in 
the "higher" reality , in the "lower" real i ty food . is . s till g rown b y  
sow ing s eeds , not eating them ; diseases st ill . cause de�th , no t health ; 
and she l�er is built by working , not wishing . Therefore , though the 
"Mys t ic" mode of awaren ess may give a person . the . knowledge that con tra­
diction s exis t , this knowledge cannot p rovi de one. with any gui dance as to 
how · to l ive in this " lower reality" where to act . on . the knowled ge that 
speaking and being quiet are no t different would be l ike acting on the 
knowl edge that l i fe and death are not opposites . Any kind o f  knowledge 
that des troys this d is t inction canno t ,  on Rand ' s  view , be an e ffe ctive 
gui de to act ions. preserving one ' s  l ife . There fore , the mode o f  aware­
nes s  from which this knowledge come s is an imp roper mode of awareness 
in that · consequen t ial behavio r iss uing from it is no t conduc ive to life . 
in mos t  ca�es , and in · o th�r cases , could b e  de st ruct ive o f  one ' s  l ife . 
It is in terms o f  the consequences that such a mode must be evaluated . 
I do no t think that i f  a person uses a "Mys ti c" mode of awarene ss 
for gaining knowledge of what . he thinks is a "higher" real i ty , and his 
re ason as a guide to his act ions , that . Rand can faul t him . Wh at , ! think 
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she faul t s  i s  the fact that those of this awareness do often rely on 
this knowledge to the exclus ion o f , reas on and in this ignore the po ss ible 
consequences this may have for the ir l iv�s . 
The ab stract principle that man ' s  life is the int rins ic go od is 
app licable to every individual . Rand wr ites : 
The task of applying this principle to a concre te specific 
purpos e-- the purpose o f  l iving a life proper ·. to .a rat ional 
being--belongs to every individual man , ·. and . the ..  life he has 
to l ive is his own . • • • The three . cardinal .. values . [ i . e .  , 
that whi ch one
.
acts to gain and / o r . keep��virtue being . the 
act by wh ich one gains and /or
.
keeps it ] • • •  are · the means 
to and a realiz ation o f  one ' s  ul timate value ,. .. one ' ..s . own li fe-­
are : Reason , Purpose , Self-Es teem , with �the ir three co rresBonding 
virtue s �  Rat ionality , Product ivene s s , Pride . 42 _ . . 
The definition o f  "value "  Rand o f fers is one that . requ ires inves tigation . 
When · she s ay s  that i t  is s omething that one "acts to gain and/or keep , "  
she impl ies that one ac ts to gain o r  keep it for . oneself . This is 
co rre c t  in many cases . However ,  thi s  does no t rule out acting to gain 
or keep something with which one might no t have a dire c t  t ie . I might . 
be - immune to s ome diseas e , but work toward i t s  prevention in order that , 
say ,  my sisters not contract it . It is be cause my sis ter s  are important 
to me that I work toward thi s cure . The s tandard o f  . all values is my 
own l i fe . There fore , all my values will have · some importance in a 
direc t  or ind ire c t  manner such that their achievemen t af fec ts my l i fe . 
In the above example , the achievement o f  a se rum will bo th be a value to 
my s i s ter , in that she will no t contract the disease , and i t  will also be 
of value to me since she is important to me . 
4 2  




As Rat ionali ty and Product ivi ty have already been discus sed , I 
should like to consider the virtue of Pride and the value o f  Self-es teem 
in turn . Both pr ide and self-esteem are st ates that .. are experienced 
psychologi c al ly , I think .. The quest ion is one of the exac t nature of 
these s tates . 
Pride is described as a vi rtue wh ich would make it an action 
given Rand ' s  de finit ion o f  virtue . In contrast · to Rand , however , I do 
not think that pride is an ac t ion at all . It is an at titude , or a 
mo t ivat ional s t ate , such as t aking pride in one ' s  work ; o r  it can be a 
rewarding feeling , such as the pride of a j ob well done . Linguis tical ly , 
I j us t  do no t think that , there is a verb . "p ride � ' that . reduces to what 
Rand thinks that it doe s . Even the use of "pride " in the s entence , "She 
prides herself in her grades , "  seems to reduce to " She takes pride in 
her grades , "  or , " She is proud of her grade s . "  When Rand tri�s to make . 
her meaning cl ear as to the way she uses the word "pr ide " many prob lems 
arise . 
Rand says that the vir tue of Pride is 
'(moral amb i t iousness ) .  • • _ • I t  me ans that one mus t . 
earn the right to hold oneself as one ' s own highest val�e by 
achieving hi s own moral per fect ion--which one . achieve s 
b y  neve r accep ting any code o f  irrat ional values impo s s ib l e  
t o  pract ice an d  b y  never failing to practice the virtues 
one knows to b e
.
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Her s ta temen t only serves to mud�y the water surrounding the que s t ion o f  
what p ride is in addit ion to raising riew problems . One o f  the new 
4 3 Ib i d . , p .  2 7 . 
prob lems concerns the meaning o f  the s tatement that "one . mus t earn the 
right to hold ones elf as one ' s  highe s t  value . "  We have . already seen 
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that one ' s  l ife is one ' s  highest value whether o r  not one recogn izes it . 
There fore earning the right to hold one ' s  l ife as the intr in s ic · good 
canno t be the meaning of the st atement . Does she . mean only that . in order 
to be proud of myself I mus t commit myself to a rational e thical code ? 
If so , then what is the meaning o f  the re ference t o  e arning the "right " 
to thi s  at t i tude or feel ing about my action s ?  In . the . f ir s t  place , i f  
she means that I must commit mysel f to a rat ional . ethi c al code and 
pract ice the ration al virtues therein , in orde r  to . b e  proud , then I 
think that she is mis taken . Children cannot b e . s aid . at the age of three 
or four to have commit ted themse lves t o  a theo retically rational code of 
values , ye t I bel ieve it is quite poss ib le that they experience pride at 
their a chievemen ts of learning to walk , talk , or tie a shoelace . I 
think that Rand should recognize that while pr ide is the resul t  o f  
e f f i cac ious act ion , o r  act ion deemed e f f i cac ious , i t  d o e s  no t have to 
be coup led with a rat ional commitment to mor al i ty . She might say that . in 
the case o f  children there is a pre-rational committment on the ir part 
to deal ing with one ' s  l i f e rational ly , but this is t o  al ter her state­
men t cons iderably . Even if we admi t thi s , there is the furthe r  prob -
lem that many people seem to be proud , o r  say that they are , and ye t have 
done no thing t o  e arn it . I bel ieve tha t  Rand is arguing that i t  is prid e  
which mus t be earne d , rather than . the right to be proud . There fore , I 
shall t ry to meet this obj ection . 
Lingu� stically , it has already been noted that the word "p ride " 
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sugges ts a feeling o r  an att itude taken by someone with referen ce to 
one ' s  achievemen ts such as , " taking pride in one ' s  work . " It i. s also 
no t . uncommon to spe ak o f  b e ing proud of o ther s ' ac tions or achievemen ts , 
e . g . , " I  was proud of you when • • • •  " Both o f  the se seem cons is tent 
with Rand ' s  point of view . However ,  ther e  is a sense of the term in 
wh�ch "pride" i s  interchangeab le with the words " ar rogant" or
.
" conceite d . "  
Nei ther of the s e  is compatible wi th the sense in which Rand uses the 
wo rk . A term that desi gnates this dif ference is !' fals e p ride . "  Ps ycho ­
logis ts recognize the defense mechani sms manifes ting . themselves in 
excess ive boasting or b ragging , o r , on the othe r . hand , . aloo f  and distain­
ful at t itudes as masks for fee l ings of in feriority , guilt , fear , or 
shame . The se are certainly no t what Rand means by .. �'pride . "  
. 
I think that i t  is · very clear that "pr ide�' , is- a .. work tha t is 
achievement-oriented . It is usually experien ced when one has d one some­
thin g  that · one (1) set out to do and did , o r  (2 ) set out to do and d id 
bet ter than one expected , or ( 3 )  set out to do and did no t do , but did 
the best one coul d . 
The f irst example is eas ily demonstrated . Jones set out to e arn 
a 4 . 0 in graduate s chool and do es it . This does no t guaran tee the pride , 
for i f  he cheated , or fixed the grade report , then i t  is doub tful that 
he made the 4 . 0 in the sense of earning it at all . The sec ond c as e  is 
similarly demons trated . Jones set s out to make a 3 . 0  in graduate 
school , but makes a 3 . 5  •
. 
The third case is more di f f icul t for i t  in­
volves failure . Suppo se that I am going to race the length o f  the p ool 
with a friend who s e  t ime is · 4 seconds f as ter than mine at the leas t . 
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My goal is to �eat the girl , but suppos e I lose the race . However ,  
suppose that I only lose to her by a t ime o f � sec onds . She s till beat 
me , but no t as badly as the t ime s indicated that she . would . I can s till 
experien ce pride that I did the be s t  that I could even though i t  was no t 
enough to win the race . 
Rand ' s  p roblem is really that o f  trying to show that pr ide i s  
something th at is earned as in the cas e s  cited above , and only in cases 
like the se . She i s  trying to show that wh at one exper iences in c ases 
where one has not achieved anything is no t p ride . I j us t  do not know 
if she c an succe ss fully argue this po sit ion . 
Rand would want to argue that the use o f  phrases such as , "black 
and proud , "  or , "white , or male , . or female , or American (excep t in cas es 
o f . immig rants who have to study , pas s  test s , e t c . , ) , or Russ ian , or 
Aryan and proud , "  are all incor rec t  uses of the word ·. ''p roud . "  Linguis­
tically , I think that the word "gl ad "  prob ably c onveys the same - s ign i­
ficance in e ach of the se examp les as the wo rd "proud . "  However , this is 
arguab le , and I do no t know if there is a convincing argumen t to the 
effe c t  that this is actually the cas e . One could ask a "proud American" 
in the sense specif ied above if he real ly doesn ' t  mean only that he is 
"glad to be an American . "  If he con cede s that thi s is real ly al l he 
means , then you have _accomplished finding that at least one person really 
meant "glad , "  and not "proud . " If he st icks by . his guns , however , and 
ins i s t s  that it _ i s  "p ride" that he experien ces by being an American , and 
not j us t  gladne s s , then what are you to do ? In sist he in tro spe c t  
furthe r ?  Clearly , a common use o f  the word "proud" sugge s ts that it can 
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also b e  a . non-achievement word . Therefore , ! . agree with Rand that the 
word "pride" and the word "proud" can be used as an achievement oriented 
wo rd . But I disagree that it is an action and tha·t it can only be used 
rightly as an achievement word . There is  j ust no conclus ive evidence 
fo r this las t claim . 
Further , Rand suggests that pride is the result of a commitment 
to a rational code of  values . This suggests that . an . experience o f  pride 
could in some sense tell one whether the code one has accep ted is 
rational or not . I disagree mos t  vigorously with this implication . It 
is man ' s ability to reason that is the final arbiter . o f  which values 
and virtues are right . There was a cul t in India , for example , around 
the time of· ·early colonization by Britain , that . bel ieved in a god of the 
road . This god demanded certain sacrifices to : made . each night .
44 
The 
members took great pains to selec t only certain kinds o f  people for the 
sacri fice , and these were killed by strangulation . The members o f  the 
cul t prided themselves on their abil ity to do their duty quickly , 
ef ficiently , and quietly . There was no personal profit involved . The 
pride that these men experienced was based on the ir belief that there 
was a road god and that they had been appointed by him to deliver a 
certain number of vict i� a night . Rand would certainly no t say that 
these men were adhering to a rational morality . Nor could she prove 
that they _ did not experience pride . Therefore . ! disagree that pride is 
always the result of a mind ' s  being ful ly commit ted to reason , and only 
to reason . 
44
The cul t is described in many historical texts on Indian 
culture . 
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Self-esteem , the last cardinal value that we shall di scuss in 
this chapter , means that a person value s himself , and in this he values 
his life . Rand says , 
Sel f-esteem is the cqnsequence , experess ion , .. and 
reward o f  a mind fully committed to reason . • • • In 
order to deal wit.h reality success fully�-to pursue and 
achieve the values which his life ·requires--man needs self­
esteem :  he needs to be confident of his . efficacy and
45 worth . • • • Sel f-esteem is a metaphys ical es timate . 
This "me� aphys ical es timate " seems to be a basis for produc tive 
act ion . This self-con fidence can be achieved from .. recogniz ing that one 
can grow intellectually and come to unders tand aspects of part icular 
endeavors , and then committing onesel f to that growth . Pride results 
from the particular mas tery o f  such endeavo rs , whereas it  is one ' s  self-
es teem that is sues the affirmation that one could do it . Rational ity is 
the process which p rovides the evidences in a given area as to whether 
one can mas ter the part icular feat , and whether it is to one ' s  advantage 
to do so . If  this relationship between self-esteem and productive act ion 
does exist , then it would , to the degree one pos sessed self-esteem , be a 
direct influence on the achievement o f  values . It is di fficult to ascertain 
whether Rand is arguing that _ sel f-e s teem is a necessary condition of 
"pursu [ ing ] and a�hiev [ ing ] the values that life requires , "  in the s ame 
sense that consciousnes s  is . If one ' s  self-es teem direc tly influences 
one ' s  cho ice to pursue , or no t to purs ue values , then , l ike cons cious-
nes s ,  I think Rand would say that bo th o f  these are extrinsically valuable . 
45
Rand , The Virtue o f  Sel fishness , pp . 36-37 . 
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That a pers on ' s  self-esteem, or  lack of it, can and does influence his 
behavior is suppo rted by psychotherap is ts and psychologis ts. It  is a 
factor in the achieving or non-achieving of values. Self-esteem is a 
property that people have in differing degrees. If it is alway s  the 
resul t of a mind ' s  "b eing fully commit ted to reason, " then there mus t be  
a lot of  people whose minds are fully commit ted to  reason. This does not 
seem to be  the case ; hence, Rand is mis taken. Perhaps a great deal of 
s elf-esteem results from this commitment. But the flat as sert ion that 
all of s elf-e steem issues from this full commitment seems to be mis taken. 
I agree that self-es teem is - of great value to one ' s  life in that it is 
sometimes a factor, or seems to be, in determining whether one acts to 
achieve his goals or to develop tho se goals. 
In summary, then, I believe that Rand ' s  values and correspond ing 
virtues have the following st atus : ( 1) Reason/Rat ionality and Purpose/ 
Productive action do seem to be  cons is tent with her foundat ional claim 
that one ' s  life is the intrins ic good since each of these are ins tru­
mental . in securing and promo ting one ' s  life. ( 2 )  Self-es teem seems to 
be a value cons istent with her foundat ional claim in that its presence 
or ab sence does affe ct one ' s  act ions, and in many cases may help to 
secure the intrinsic good. ( 3) Pride, on the other hand, does no t 
seem to be an ac tion, nor does it seem to be inst rumental in a�hieving 
the knowledge that what one does is right. It do�s no t appear to be 
the least b it - connec ted with t4e securing or promo ting of one ' s  life . 
However, I do think that pride is a "contribut ive" go od in that the 
experience of pride contributes to my life great ly as a whole . 
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The conclus ion of the cons ideration of these values and virtues 
b rings me to Chapter I II in my analys is of Rand ' s  ethical p o s i t ion . 
Chap ter Ill deals with two primary things : f irs t , her theory o f  ob l iga- . 
t ion , and , second , happines s .  I shall dis cus s them in that o rder . 
CHAPTER I II 
THEORY OF OBLIGATION AND HAPPINESS 
Rand ' s  theo ry of _obligation is set forth very clearly in the 
fo llowing statement. 
The basic social principle of the Obj ectivist ethics 
is that jus t. as life is an end in itself, so · .every living 
being is an ,end in himf?elf, no t the means .. to the .ends or 
the wel fare of others--and, there fore, .. that man .must  . live 
for his own sake, nei ther 
'
sacrificing �himself to .others, 
nor sacrificing others to himsel f .  To live for his . own 
sake means that th� achievement of his own happiness is 
man ' s  highest moral purpose .46 
Rand has al ready . argued that each organism ' s  life is . th� intrinsic good 
for that organism. On her view, then, whether a man regards his life as ' .. 
the ul timate value or not , does no t neg ate · the fact tha t his life is 
the ul t imate value for him. What this statement reveals , then , is that 
Rand commends each · person to recognize that his life is the in trins ic 
value . 
There are two maj or  claims in Rand ' s  social principles that 
require inves tigation . The first is that a man should neve r sacrifice 
himself to others, no.r sacrifice others to himself. The second claim is 
that each man ' s highest mo ral purpose is the achievement of his own 
happine ss. We shall invest igate the se cl aims respectively. 
The principle of non-sacrifice is ab solutely crucial to Rand ' s  
ethics . However, the main question involved is no t whether her position 
4 6 Ib id • , p • 2 7 • 
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is right or wrong standing by itself , but whe ther , given her view that 
the intrinsic good .is one ' s  life , the principle of  non-sacrifice fit s 
consis tently with this foundat ional claim . An examination o f  what Rand 
means by sacri fice may help to clarify some o f  the questions that may 
arise regarding her social principle . She defines " sacrif ice" as "the 
surrender o f  a higher value in favor o f  a
-
�:wer value or of a non-value . , ,47 
Two po ints should be noted concerning this definition . Firstly , the fact 
that one believes that a sacrifice is made does no t . en tail that one is : 
a definite surrender o f  a greater value to a lesser one mus t take place 
be fore one has sacrificed . The criterion used to . discover whether or 
not one has s acrified the criterion o f  all value is . one ' s  own life . In 
other words , for Rand , if  a value is  that which promo tes or helps to 
secure my l ife , then a sacrifice consists in surrender ing that which 
help s to pr9�ote or secure my life in favor o f  either that which will 
no t promo te my l ife at �all , or that which will not promo te it to the same 
extent as that which I am surrendering . The s econd point  is that it is 
thought by some ethical philosophers that one must make genuine , volun-
tary sel f- sacri fices if one is to be moral . These sacrifices usually 
mean the disregarding of one ' s  own interests . It is enlightening to 
find that rules in society such as "Thou shall not kill" are not to my 
interest . We sh�ll discuss this shortly . 
One maj or prob�em o f  Rand ' s  social principle is the reconcilia-
tion o f  two principles or rules . The first is that I shall not sacrifice 
4 7 Ib id . , p .  40 . 
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my life , nor the means I have t o  insure my life ( for example , reason , 
productive action , and self-es teem) to others . This seems to be con­
sistent with her theory since my l ife is the ultimate · value to me . The 
second rule is that I shall not sacrifice others to myself . This means 
that I shall not sacrifice their lives , nor the means they have to in­
sure their l ives , to my life . 
As her theory is formulated ,  however ,  I do not . think that the 
lat ter rule follows consistently from her b asic claim that one ' s  own 
life is the in trinsic good . I may kill ano ther and . eat his flesh . He 
clearly would have been sacrificed to the betterment o f  my life since he 
wo uld have nourished me . But since my life is the . intrinsic good and the 
only one fo r me , how can .this action be counted as - wrong? Rand does not 
offer any reason why this would be wrong . She j ust as serts that it is . 
From s tudying her fict ion , as well as her ess ays , one becomes aware 
that Rand is far mo re concerned with the issue of sacrificing oneself 
to others than she is with the issue of  sacrificing o thers to oneself .  
What I shall do here i s  to try to const ruct and defend an argu­
ment showing that sacri fices of others to onesel f is wrong , and indica­
ting why it is , in hope s of rendering Rand ' s  social principle consis tent 
with her o ther e thical premisses . I will be using many of  Rand ' s  own 
ideas and tenets which she set s  forth in her polit ical philosophy . It 
is the ethical impl ications , however ,  rather than political applica­
tions that will concern me . 
Although men have the ir own individual lives which they mus t 
sustain , it is a hist orical fact that they live in a social context , 
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i . e . , with other men . This does not diminish the fact that it is  indi-
vidual men who make up these groups . The attempt to reconcile my life ' s 
being the intrinsic good to me with the principle . that I may not sacri-
fice others to my life can be effected through the principle of individual 
rights . The principle of individual rights within . a group serve s as a 
rule which precludes certain act ions on the part of . individual s and gains 
fo r tho se ind ividuals '  protect ion from those same actions on the part of 
o thers . Remarks dealing with the concep t of  individual right s are 
scattered throughout Rand ' s  political philosophy . She writes of the 
concept : 
' Right s' are a moral concept--the concep t . that . . provide s 
a logical transition from the principles guid ing an individual ' s  
act ions to · the principles guiding his �relat ionship .with others-­
the concept that preserves and pro tec ts individual mo rality in 
a soc ial context • • • •  48 
Rand implies that rights are not a gift from God , nor a gif t  from soc iety , 
but have their source in man ' s nature . 4 9 She does no t elaborate on 
this po int . There fo r� I am no t qui te sure what she means by this s tate-
ment . If she means that rights inhere in a man ' s  nature like breathing 
oxygen does , then .it is no t rights themselves that evolved , but the 
re cognition o f  these rights by men . It is beyond the scope of  this 
paper to try to argue the quest ion of whether right s are/ are not gifts 
from God or soc iety , or inhere /do not inhere in man ' s  nature . 
I can agree· wi th Rand that "right s"  is a concep t .  Like other 
concep ts , it ar ises because of man ' s ab ility to think and to communicate 
4 8
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his ideas wi th o thers . Reason , confirms that ind ividual rights are to 
the interest of every single pers on for the ins tantiation of the concept 
provides this rule : Each man has the right to his . own l ife and to that 
which he can achieve and produce in his life for . the- betterment of his 
life , so long as he doe s no t infringe on the lives of . others to do so . 
With the instant iation o f  individual rights , I can know that I 
am pro tec ted from o thers ' would-be aggress ions , j us t . as they are pro­
tec ted from mine . Adherence to the rules implicit . in individual rights 
wil l  salvage Rand ' s  principle of  non-sacrif ice of o ther s  to oneself 
without con tradict ing her bas ic premiss . 
Three questions concern ing individual rights .. are : ( 1 )  Does the 
ins tant iation o f  individual right s involve a sacrifice by each man? . 
( 2 )  What is the j ustification of individual . rights ?  ( 3) How does the 
instant iation o f  individual right s affect emergen cy situations ? 
( 1 )  Regarding. the first quest ion , I do no t think that the ins tan­
tiation of individual right s involve a sacrifice on the part o f  any man . 
My being protected from ano ther ' s  would-be agressions � and his being 
protected from mine is  a case of fair exchange . On both parts as surances 
are given and received . To be sure , my giving my ass urance to my 
ne ighbor that I will no t kill , conquer , or rob him is to his self­
interest . Were this the end o f  the mat te� there could arise s ituations 
o f  de finite sacrifice on my p�rt . However , his assurance to me that he 
wil l  no t rob , conquer , or kill me is to my self-interes t .  The recipro­
city of the agreement to adhere to individual rights is what makes the 
agreement to my self-interes t .  
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Even if I am unusually s trong and char ismatic , my adherence to 
individual rights is equivalent to my neighbor ' s .  My s trength and 
chraisma are no t al tered by the agreement ; nor is , say , the dead-aim my 
ne ighbo r may have with - a rifle . In adhering to individual rights neither 
of us lose  the capacity to  be killed , robbed , or conquered . These 
capacities remain whether individual rights are instantiated or no t .  
(2). There are two main points to be . cons idered regarding the 
j us ti ficat ion of individual rights . In some cases , . if individual rights 
are no t instantiated , we have the al ternative of . no . rules whatever . On 
the other hand (and by far the mo s t  exemplified situation) if  individual 
rights · are not instantiated uniformly , then we may . have what I shal l 
call "select rights . "  This means that the rights of one group are 
different from another in the s ame social group . I think I can show 
that it is to my best interest that , rather than either o f  the alterna­
tives above , uniform individual right s be instant iated . First , then , 
concerning the alternative whe re ne ither individual rights nor sele ct 
rights are ins tantiated , we have a situation where "kill or be killed" 
is an ap t de scription . It seems obvious to me that th is kind of si tua­
tion would have a devastating effect  on my ability to live . Fear would 
be a viable mot ive for action and would remain so since from moment to 
momen� there would exist po ss ible thre�ts from another to my person/life . 
To be constantly fearful or to be constantly threatened would no t be to 
my self-interes t in that both could hamper the effectivenes s  of my actions 
whic� could resul t in my b eing unab le to live . Second , if the rules 
adhered to are such that the lives of  some are protected , while the lives 
65 
of o thers are not ,  or are no t protected to the same degree , then my l ife 
will be adversely affected , whether I am in the privileged group or the 
other . If I am a memb er of the group which is not pro tected by the 
right s and rules that pro tec t the other group , then in the areas in 
which I am not protected , my life , or ef fort s and achievement s of my 
life , might be sacrif iced . It still remains true that the buildings I 
build fo r them, or the food I grow for them are not a fair exchange for 
the food and clo thes they provide me with . Fo r I might be able to feed 
and clothe my self without having to build the buildings , or grow the 
food that they take . The fact that I am no t allowed an option in such 
situat ions to reason as to how I will l ive , or the condit ions under which 
I will work is enough by itself to make this a sacrif ice . If , on the 
other hand , I am a member of the group that _the se select right s protect , 
then I may have dissent ion , revolution , and death to look fo rward to 
from tho se who have been given fewer rights , and thus , no as surance of  
maintaining de . facto the protect ion that I have been given de  j ure . 
It is important to note that history is full of examples of  this 
second kind of so cial order . Many of the se orders last for generat ions . 
However , upon real iz ing that the disparity o f  rights exist s ,  and that 
the basis or reasons fo r the disparity are bo th quest ionable , and , 
given certain assumptions , illogical , the group which is less pro tected 
will seek to alleviate the situation . MO st cases in history show that 
the actions to alleviate the situat ion took the form of violent as sault and 
counter-assaul t by the privileged members of the soc ial order . Further , 
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it does no t mat ter who "wins . "  If my life , as a member of the protected 
group , is los t in such a s truggle , and this could have been avoided by 
the instantiation of individual right� then it was not worth it to me to 
have the exis ting order continue . Even if my life . is  no t los t , I will have 
los t in other ways as a result of the s truggle . His tory goes on to show 
that when the exist ing inequality of rights is not alleviated , then the 
society usually has the same pro ces s to look forward to again . There 
may be other reas ons for such uprisings ; however , . in mos t  revolutionary 
accounts , from the Hebrew Exodux from Egypt to the American Revolut ion , 
inequality of rights is at the bottom of many grievances .  Many times 
it seems that the reasons for the inequality are the focus of the revolt , 
for
. 
example , reasons such as the Will of Pharoah , or The Divine Rights 
of  Kings , skin color , bad blood , or tradition , were , and in some cases 
s till are , the seeds of  discontent o f  the less protected segment of a 
socie ty . 
Even as a member of the protected clas s ,  I should realize that 
the social s tability of such an arrangement is precarious . Since social 
disharmony can and does af fect the product ivity of my ·life adversely , 
I should want to have rules that pro tect all individuals alike . There­
fore , in both kinds of social st ructure , the j ustification of individual 
rights remains the same : my life . 
(3)  The third question regarding individual rights is whether or 
no t the ins tantiation ,of the concept af fec ts particul ar emergency situa­
tions and ,  if it does , how it does . Dis cus sion of emergency situations 
is some t imes called "li feboat ethi cs . "  Rand does a good deal of 
complaining about this kind of  thinking , but she · never . quite admits or 
resolves either that there· may arise cases of which . the proposit ion , 
" It is your life or mine , "  is the only apt description , or what to do 
about them. The principle o f  individual rights cannot . help a person 
here ; s ince individual rights extends to persons impartially , the 
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si tuation it self excludes the poss ib ility o f  deciding who lives and who 
dies on the gro�nds of "rights . "  
-
Suppo se , then , that I am in a life boat with ano ther person and 
the l ife boat can only hold one long enough to reach safety . After 
ru�ning through various_ po ss ibilities such as , the . younger person lives , 
and the older person drowns , or the one with a family lives , and the one 
without a family drowns , or the woman lives and the man drowns , I have 
reached the conclus ion , perhaps unj ustifiab ly , that in such a s ituation , 
there is no way to reasonably determine in all cases who will live and 
who will die . For in the case of  each o f  the above s tandards which 
attemp ts to determine the issue , everything could be . equal in a given 
si tuation . Both may be aged twenty . Bo th may have . a family o f  four . 
Both may be women . 
The only way to resolve the issue , when all things are equal , is 
perhaps an . agreement to let a flip of the coin decide . This solut ion 
is offered in all seriousness , for the above "reasons " amoun t to almost 
the same thing . For example , if both parties decided to use age as the 
criteria,  then each would be hoping himself to be the youngest . Whoever 
turned out to be the youngest , by a ·year or a day , was allowed to live 
by the chance of the standard decided upon . The same can be said of 
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strength i f  the two people engage in physical b attle . each trying t o  toss 
the other one out of the boat . A co in- flip amounts to about the same 
tliing . 
I do not know how Rand would res olve this situat ion . There is 
certainly no indication that she would resolve it the way in which I 
have resolved it . It seems tQ me , however ,  that any advice such as , 
"Jump out if  you love the o ther person , "  or "Try to toss the other guy 
out , '·' will e ither contradict. the sp irit of her work , or come down to a 
coin- flip . Individual rights ,  then , cannot help you in an emergency o f  
this kind . 
There are great benefits to be derived from a social existence . 
------------------------------
However ,  these benefits do not proceed from either a sacrifice of one ' s  
own values , or the sacrifice of o thers . They proceed from a principle 
of trade and from knowledge . "Man is the only species that can transmit . 
and expand his s tore o f  knowledge fro� generation to generation 
every man gains an . incalculable benefit from the knowledge discovered 
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by o thers . "  For example , benefits I have gained from the contribu-
tions o f  s cientis t s  are the as surances that I will not . get polio or 
typho id fever because of  the serums they dis covered . A second great 
benefit stems f rom " the division of  labor :  it enables a man to devo te 
his effort to a particular field of work and to trade with o thers who 
specialize in o ther fields . Thi s  form o f  cooperation allows all men who 
take part in it to achieve a greater knowledge , skill , and product ive re-
turn on their effor t than they could achieve if each had to produce 
50 
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every thing he needs , "  by himsel f .  Trade , as oppo sed to sacri fice , is 
the pr inciple whi ch Rand sets out as being the proper "rational ethical 
principle for all human relat ionships . • • • It is the principle of 
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justice . "  Knowledge and trade are , then , tools for the betterment of 
the qual ity and the leng th of  life . The principle of jus t ice is one 
principle among o thers , that are "chosen and val idat ed by a process of 
thought . "
5 3 This princ iple , and the virtue of trade exemplifying it , 
means , "one must never seek or grant the unearned and undes erved , ne ither 
i i i i ,.
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n mat ter nor n sp r t .  • • • Further : 
Jus tice is the recognit ion of the fact that you canno t 
fake the character of men as you canno t fake the character 
o f  nature , [without the sub sequent negation of one ' s  per cep­
tion of and reasonings concerning real ity] that you must 
j udge all men as cons cient iously as you j udge inanimat e 
obj ects • • • that every man must be j udged fo r what he is 
and treated ac cordingly • • • that your mo ral appra isal is 
the co in paying men for their virtues or vices , and this 
payment demands of you as scrupulous an honor as you bring 
to financ ial transactions--that to withho ld your contemp t 
from men ' s  vices is an act of moral counter feit ing ; and to 
withhold your admirat ion from their virtues is an act of 
mo ral embezz lement . . 55 
For example , if two men are working on a proj ect which will cure cancer , 
and one man ' s  efforts are conscientously d irec ted to the goal , and he 
succeeds in unlo cking the last door to the cure , fo r ano ther man , who has 
wo rked with him,  to wi thhold his admirat ion from the success of the first 
51
Ib id . , 
5 2-Ib id . , 
5 3
rb id . , 
55  
Rand , 
P • 32 . 
p .  31 . 
p .  26 . 
Atlas Shrugsed , 
54 
Ib id . , p .  26 . 
PP • 1019-1020 . 
is an attempt to keep from acknowledging the fact that _ he was success­
ful . The embezz lement has two parts : the fi_rst is the fact that a 
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cure was e f fected by the first man . The second is the second man ' s 
at temp t to ignore or forget that fact . In a like manner ,  if they are 
working together and the firs t man � s  e fforts are haphazard , or if he is 
contributing l it tle or no thing to the advancement of the proj ect , 
ano ther man ' s attemp t to cover up for , or ignore , the . first man ' s inept­
ness is an at temp t to wipe out the fact that there is . a  proj ect , and 
that the first man is not doing his part . What . is counterfeited is 
that this first man is doing his share of the work . effectively . The 
reason these actions are wrong is that they are paramount to the declara­
tions : "Who am I to j udge ? "  which means , "Who am I to think? " which 
means , "Who am I to live ? "  These entail the rej ection of the ultimate 
value . 
The relation between these declarations is this : In order to 
live , a person mus t think in normal cases . This process , though not the 
same as j udging , includes j udging . For example , one can think about the 
di f ferences in snakes , mushrooms , and men � but one j udges , on the basis 
o f  evidence , whether what one sees is  a poisonous snake or not , a 
poisonous mushroom or  no t ,  or whe ther the man one wo rks with is working 
or no t .  Judging is a part o f  what thinking includes . Further , accord­
ing to Rand , ,it is a most important part in that one ' s j udgements can 
affe ct the maintenance o f  one ' s  life . For Rand , to voluntarily suspend 
one ' s  j udgement of a situation is like knowing the difference be tween a 
· good doctor and a b ad docto r ,  but refusing to be guided by that knowledge 
in choos ing one ' s  surgeon . It is in this way that these declarat ions 
are related . 
There are cases in which the declaration , "Who am I to j udge ? "  
does not mean these things . Suppo se I am asked which of  two cars has 
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the bet ter engine . Given that I know nothing about car engines , honestly 
demands that I admit that I do not know the better engine and in this 
case am no t one to be j udging . If I do know about car engines ,  however ,  
then I should b e  able t o  p ick out the better engine ( if there i s  one ) 
and state my reasons for its being so . Again it is the use o f  man ' s  
rational faculty and his commitment t o  learning the fac ts that provides 
a person with the knowledge of the facts ; and this determines the 
validity of this principle . A person who does no t apply this principle , 
when he can ,  is no t act ing in the best interests o f  his own l ife s ince 
it is his own apprehension of the fac ts that he refuses to acknowled�e .  
Rand calls the person who acts on the princ iple o f  j us tice a 
trader . She describes a trader as one who 
does no t t reat men as mas ters o r  slaves , but as independent 
equals . • • • [ He]  does no t expec t to be paid for his default s ,  
only for his achievement s .  He do es not switch to others the 
burden o f  his failures ,  and he does not mo rtgage his l ife in 
bondage to the failures of  o thers . • • • In spiritual is sues . 
The currency is different • • •  [ i . e . , no t mat erial ] �  but the 
principle is the same .  Love , friendship , respect , admiration are 
the emo t ional response of one man to the virtues of another , the 
spiritual payment given in exchange fo r the personal , sel fish 
pleasure [ i . e . , happ in�s s ]  which one man derives from the virtues 
of ano ther man ' s  character . • • • A t rader is a man who do es not 
seek to be loved for his weaknesses or  fl aws , only for his virtues , 
and who does not grant his love in response to the weaknesses or  
the flaws of  o thers , only to their virtues . To love is to value • • 
The man who does not value himself canno t �alue anything to anyone . 5 6 
56Rand , The Virtue o f  Sel f ishness , pp . 31-3 2. 
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Although this statement s eems to idealize actual personalities , I do not 
find it inoperative from the s tandpoint o f  her explication of j ustice 
as a principle of act ion guiding a man ' s  relationship with others . Rand 
is commend ing this principle and consequent action to her readers . She 
would no t be commending it i f  it were already the way mos t  relationships 
really were a 
The value o f  o thers is an instrumental value to me in the follow­
ing ways : The knowledge , skills , and productive action of  people in a 
society lead to a betterment o f  both my life , through my working and/or 
trading with others , and that o f  society as a whole , as in the case of 
special research and work-saving technique s . I ,  als o ,  will be of  
ins trumental value to others through trade . Fur ther , o ther s are o f  
instrumental value to my achievement of happiness through what Rand 
re fers to as "spiritual" trade � The emo tions of  love , respect , admira­
tion , and friendship are governed ( or should be on Rand ' s  view) by 
this principle . The trade is of this nature : Respect , admiration , and 
friendship are emotional responses on the part o f  one man directed to 
another in payment for the happines s one derives from the virtues and.  
the character of  the other . The emo tions themselves ,  and the relat ion­
ship which elicits them , are valuable in that they are ins trumental to 
my achievement o f · happines s ,  which is a great contributive good . 
There is  a point of  clari fication needed concerning this spiri tual 
trade . In one sense my emotional response of , say ,  admirat ion can be an 
actual paymen t .  This occur s when the person whom I admire knows o f  my 
admirat ion for him and /or his virtues . But there are instances where 
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the pers on knows nothing of  this because ( 1 )  he is dead , o r  ( 2 )  we have 
never me t ,  or ( 3 )  both of  these . For example , if my s ister were to die , 
in all likelihood , my admiration for her would cont inue . Her death 
prevents her from ever knowing this , and thus , in a real sense ever 
collect ing the payment that I would be giving to her . In a like manner , 
my admiration for Plato may cont inue until I gie , but he will never know 
it . Although the collect ion of  the "paymen t" of  my admirat ion is barred 
to these two people , the principle of trade is no t al tered by this . It 
is st ill true that my admiration for both my dead sister and Plato arose 
from what each of them did . The action of writing his thoughts and in­
sights , and the fact that I derive great pleasure and . other benefits 
from reading the se thought s evokes in me an admiration for Plato hims elf 
though he cannot collect this payment . Were he here , and we re I to 
mee t him, he would collect this part of the trade . 
Before moving to the dis cuss ion o f  happiness , I would like to 
re iterate the po ints that I made concerning Rand ' s  theory o f  ob ligation . 
The only way I can see that her theory o f  non-s carifical living can be 
made cons is tent with her other claims is by the introduc tion of the 
concep t of  individual rights . Through the use o f  this concept one can 
move from the "rules of  thumb " and "I can ge t away with it " posit ion 
that inheres in traditional egoism , to a principle that is explicit and 
to the interests o f  every individual . It does not seem to me to involve 
a sacri fice on the part of individu al men to subs cribe to such a rule , 
but rather to serve each man ' s  in teres t .  The fact that I canno t kill my 
neighbor for money does not mean that I cannot make money , nor does his 
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no t killing me for my money ent ail that he cannot make money . It means 
that ne ither of us can procure money in that way . In a social community , 
men ' s  lives are in want o f  protec tion from the whims of o thers . "Rights" 
are no t new to the history of  man . Indeed , there have been the rights 
of the kings over their subj ects , the rights of the Russ ian lords over 
their serfs , the right s of the Pharoah over the slaves , and the rights 
of  the state over the individual.  Individual rights . dif fer from these in 
that they do not select one group over another in a society to have mo re 
or less protection than the other . They do no t guarantee that each 
individual will achieve those values that he sets out to pursue ; only 
that he can try . In this attempt he must depend on his own effort and 
the efforts of  those who voluntar ily consent to help him. The j ustifi­
cation of this principle is the fact that it is my life that is intrins i­
cally valuable to me . This is not to maintain that the principle of  
ind ividual rights will always be in service to my life . For in some 
instances , such as those that obtain in the l ife-boat example , the 
principle canno t designate that I will live and the other person will 
drown . Further , it is  not the case that the p r inc iple is unable to be 
legit imately violated . Particular s ituations o f  the type "kill or be 
killed" may arise where not to kill someone might be a sacrif ice of my 
own life . In this lat ter s ituat ion , if it  is obvious that Jones is  about 
to  kill me , then the princ iple is not b inding on me for that ins tance . 
The violat ion o f  the princ iple , however , like the implementat ion o f  it , 
should be a result of wanting to pro tect one ' s  life since this is the 
ult imate value and obligation . 
From the theory of obl igat ion we turn to Rand ' s statement that 
75 
the achievement of one ' s  own happiness is the highest moral purpose that 
one has (Cf . p .  59 ) . What is the meaning of this claim? We have seen 
that the princ ipl e of  trade and /or j ustice is compatible with a person ' s  
intrins ic value , i . e . , it is to the best int erest o f  a person ' s  l ife 
as to avo id sacrif icing o thers or himself , or his j udgement s o f  others , 
in normal situations . Happiness , on the other hand is no t an ac tion , 
nor a material good like fo od , clo thing , or dishwashers . Rand says quite 
a lot about happ iness , and the first statement we will investigate 
conc erns the nature of happiness . Rand says that happ iness 
is the success ful state of life [while ] suf fering is the 
warning signal of failure of death . • • • Emotions are the 
automatic results  o f  man ' s  value j udgement s integrated by his 
subconscious ; emot ions are estimates of  that which furthe rs 
man ' s  values or threatens them. • • • Since man has no auto­
mat ic knowledge , he can have no automat ic [knowledge of]  values ; 
since he has no innate ideas , he can have no innate value j udge-
ments . • �ppiness is that state of consciousness that proceeds 
from the ach ievement of o - 's values . S/ 
' 
Rand makes three dist inguishable claims in this s tatement . The first 
is that happ iness is an emo tional s tate . While this has been di sputed , 
I agree wi th Rand that happiness is , indeed , an emo t ion . The second 
claim is that emo tions are the automatic resul ts o f  value j udgements 
in tegrated by a man ' �  subconscious . Since this claim is unqualif ied , I 
am no t sure if she means that all emo tions are the results of value 
j udgements , or that only some are . If she means the latter , ' then I am 
in agreement with her .  Exper ientially it does seem to be true that 
one will exper ience emo tions such as happ iness as a consequence of  
achieving one ' s  value . If she means the fo rmer , however , I am no t in 
57
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agreement wi t� her ! The as sert ion that all . emotions result from value 
j udgements seems to have this very obvious counter-example , viz . , 
children and infants certainly seem to exhibit emo tions . I do not think 
th.at Rand would want to accredit them with having made value j udgements .  
She might , however , s ay that . they had made a sort of  pro to-j udgement , 
which could perhaps be defended . On the o ther hand , she might want to 
maintain that what i�fants and children experience is merely pleasure 
or pain . This would be in conflict with recent psychological s tudies 
that reveal that children do suffer emo tionally from , s ay ,  lack o f  
affection o 
When Rand uses the word "pleasure" or "pain" she means it to 
refer to a phys ical sensat ion . When she uses the word� "emotion" she 
means it to refer to psychological state · that may or may no t have to do 
with the phys ical sens ations of one ' s body . For example , i f  my dog 
were killed , there would be no phys ical trauma occurring in my body , but 
I would be suffering nonetheles s .  
The third claim in the statement is an ·implication of  the second : 
It is that happiness proceeds from the achievement of  one ' s  values . If 
this means that the only source of happ ines s is the achievement of one ' s  
... -------
values , then I think that Rand is mistaken . Surely one can experience 
-- ----
happ iness during the endeavor to achieve one ' s  values . At leas t I have 
not been able to dis t inguish phenomeno logically between what I feel 
emot ionally at times when I am endeavoring to achieve my values , and what 
I feel upon the success o f  the deneavor . Further , we experience happi-
� 
ness when tho se close to us achieve success or are happy . 
-·· ----- ---
7 7  
A fourth claim that Rand makes concerning happines s i s  that it 
should be the moral purpose of  each person ' s  l ife . I cannot agree with 
this claim . Since happ iness is , at least in many cases , the result or 
reward of  the achievements of one ' s values , then it . seems to me that the 
achievement o f  one ' s  values , rather than happiness , ought to be the 
moral purpos e o f  one ' s  life . A fifth claim she makes concerning happi-
nes s  is this : "The maintenance o f  [one ' �  life and the pursuit of  happi-
5 8  nes s are no t two separate . is sues . "  Here , again , I think that she is 
making a mistake . Happiness is _ no t the same thing as life , concep tually 
speaking , and to maintain the former may no t be to maintain the lat ter . 
To treat . happines s  as eithe r the purpose o f  ethics , or  as "the goal and the 
reward of  life , "59 (a  s ixth claim) is to tal ly inconsis ten t with her 
previously s tated position . If there is anything that is the goal or 
reward o f  life , then life be comes a means to that end--which is to say 
that it  no longer bears the s tatus o f  the intrinsic go od . It is 
acknowledged that life is a necessary condition of  happiness,  and , thus 
the happy person will also be al ive ; however , for Rand to make the goal 
happiness , rather than life , is to contradict her previous claims . 
I bel�eve that . she can hold the following claims concern ing 
happ iness cons istently : (1 )  Happiness resul ts from the achievements of 
one ' s  values , though no t exclusively from this , and (2 ) happines s is a 
great contributive value in that it contributes to my life as a whole , 
" . . .60 h and ( 3 )  happiness is a s t ate o f  non-contradictory J OY •  T e meaning 
5 8  
Ib id . , p .  29 . 
59 Rand , Atlas Shrugged , p .  102 1 .  
60Ibid . , p .  102 2 . 
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of this last claim is that one canno t really be happy . if  one is feeling 
guilty , or sorry , or sad about that which has made one happy . This 
seems obviously true to me . 
Rand offers two othe r explications of  happ ines s th�t I think need 
to be looked at s ince neither of them seem to s tem from the · afo re-
mentioned claims . The firs t draws an analogy between happ iness and a 
b arometer . She writes : 
Your emotions are estimates o f  that which .furthers .your 
l ife or threatens it , lightening calculators giving .. you . . a .  
sum o f  your pro f it or loss . You have no choice ab out your 
capacity to feel that something is good for you .o r . evil , but 
•
· 
• • what will give you j oy or pain , what you will love or 
or hate , de sire or fear , depends on your standard of value : 6l 
This seems to be a very awkward view of the emo tional mechanism in man . 
It does seem true in some instances that one ' s  emotions are lightning 
calculators giving you a sum of your profit or loss . It seems that the 
grief we feel at the death of  a loved one , or  the fear that we have of  
being run over by a car , say ,  do is sue from s ituations in which one has 
gained or lo st , or could gain o r  lose , that which contributes to one ' s  
l i fe , o r  one ' s  life itself . However , what of the genuine emo tions that 
many people feel in response to situations in which they are no t even 
involved? Thi s kind of  emo tion is usually called "empathy . "  For 
example , I may go to a movie and cry watching _ the experiences of a 
fictitious family . The sadness or fear or  j oy I experience during the 
movie canno t be said to issue est imates of  that which furthers or 
6 1
Ibid . , p .  1021 . 
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endangers my life , for I am in a dark movie house , and whatever emo tions 
I am experiencing are issued in response to the happenings on the 
screen . Therefo re , I do no t think that the sweeping s ta�ement that 
emo tions calculate my own profit or los s is valid . They als o  seem to 
gauge the pro fit or loss o f _ others on some occas ions . 
A second problem concerning Rand ' s  view o f  emo tion is  her claim 
that I "have no choice about [my ]  capaci ty to feel that something is  good 
for [me ]  qr evil , but what [ I ] w�ll consider good or evil • • •  depends 
62 
on my s tandard of value . "  What is the meaning of th is s tatement? It 
is true that men have no choice as to whether they can experience emo-
tiont . This capacity seems to be inborn in all men . What Rand means is 
that I do no t have a cho ice as to whether or no t I will po sses s this 
capacity . I simply have the capaci ty to experience emo tions ; these 
emo t ions include feeling that things are good for me or bad for me , and 
also , extend beyond my own personal victories and tr ials , as was shown 
in the example of the movie . When she says that what I cons ider good or 
b ad for me depends on my s tandard o f  valu� she mean� firs t!� that the 
events that give rise to j oy or unhappiness in pers on ! are a consequence 
o f  his consciously or unconsciously held values , an� secondly , that these 
same events may no t give rise to j oy or unhappiness in person !, because 
his values may differ considerably from A' s .  There does no t seem to be 
a contradic tion in asserting that I have no cho ice as to whether I shall 
have the capacity to experience emo tions , but that what I actually do 
62 
Ibid . , p .  102 1 .  
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experience emotionally is tied to my standard of value , which I do have 
control over . It is similar to saying that one does not have a cho ice 
about the capacity to experience pleasure and pain , but what pleasures · 
and pains one does experience depend on one ' s  environment , one ' s  parent s ,  
o r  whatever . 
Although the statement is not sel f-contradictory , the problem o f  
ascertaining i t s  truth or fals ity remains . I am j ust not sure whether 
one can answer this . Rand ' s  claim seems to account for the difference 
between people ' s  emot ions . For if there are different values for dif fer-
ent people , then there will be as many different responses emo t�onally 
to one thing as there are degrees of value , dis-value , or disinteres t .  
This is not yet . a full account o f  Rand ' s  position concerning 
happ iness . In several places she seems tq hold no t only that happiness 
is the resul t o f  achieving one ' s  values , but that it  is  the resul t of  
63  "achieving values that are real . "  A corollary of  this statement is  
that with the achievement of false or irrat ional values , one experiences 
pseudo-happ iness . At this po int I shall try to analyze this pos it ion . 
The earmark o f  pseudo�happ ines s  is that it involves a contra-
diction . Real happiness , recall , is a state o f  non-cont radictory j oy 
( Cf .  p .  79 ) . Rand describes this pseudo-happ ines s  in Atlas Shrugged . 
In the novel Hank Rearden is a man who holds it his duty to do 
certain things for his family . " He told himself that he 
had to at tend the party--that he had to learn to l ike their plea-
64 sure for the ir sake--not his own . " Unl ike the other phases o f  
63 Ib id • , p o 10 2 2 • 64 Ibid . pp . 130-131 . 
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his life , however , Rearden learns that the actions p roceeding from a ;Value 
euch as � the - duty to do � because his family had the righ t to demand 
it of him does not engender the des ire to do tho se ac tions : "Throughout 
his l if� whenever he became convinced that a course of  action was right , 
the des ire to follow it had come automatically . • • • [ In his private 
life came ] the impossible confl ict of feeling reluctant to do that which 
was right . The duty Rearden thought was right was in 
direct conflict with his des ire to per form it . 
Now this state of  a�fairs , i . e . , the thinking that something is 
right to do , but feeling reluctance to do it , is supposed to  be a clue 
to the fact that the value from whi ch the contemplated action proceeds 
(in this case , duty to his family )
.
is an irrational value . Thi s entire 
line of reasoning seems , however ,  to confl ict with her s tatemen t that 
emo t ions are p rogrammed by one ' s  standard of value . It seems that if 
Rearden really thought it was right to go to the party , then , if emo-
tiona are determined by one ' s  values , he would have wan ted to go to the 
par ty . If "doing what is right " is a value to Rearden , and "go ing to 
the party" is an instance of  "do ing what is right " in Rearden ' s  mind , and 
if he desires to do that which is right , then he should be de siring to 
go to that party . In truth , however ,  he dreads go ing . There is not 
one intimation that he wants to go . Further , the only emotion that he 
feels when it is over is relief . I do not think that in normal cir cum-
s tan ces one is apt to confuse relie f  with happiness . One might feel 
65 Ib id . , p. 131 . 
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them bo th arise in certain circums tance s ,  such as being res cued from a 
mine after its tunnel had collap sed . However ,  the two emot ions seem to 
me to be dis tinguishable . 
The con tradic tion then is not one that arises during the experi­
ence of  happ iness , but between thinking that something is right to do 
and the confl ict ing rational de sire to keep from do ing it . For Rand 
the nature of emotions and the nature o f  des ires are the same . Both 
proceed from one ' s  standard of value (Cf . p .  79 ) . 
Further , if this confl ict between desiring not to do x and think­
ing that it is right to do x can be unravelled to disclose the holding 
o f  an irrat ional value , then it seems that the emotions I experience 
become a guide to my ' intellect . Rand . would certainly not want to hold 
this pos it ion . I admit that they would only be guide s in the weak sense 
tha t they would tell me something was wrong , but not what to do about 
it . But it does seem that the experience o f  such a conflict does alert 
my intellect . Perhaps this is what Rand means by this kind o f  clue . 
I do no t know how Rand would respond to these two points . 
To draw the conclusion that one ' s values and one ' s  emot ions have 
nothing to do with each other seems as false as the claim that one ' s  
emot ions are to tally grounded on and issue from one ' s  values . The 
relat ionship between one ' s  emot ions and one ' s  values seem to be mo re 
sub tle than the descrip t ion o f fered by Rand . · Like 
many o ther philosophers ,  she s eems to be saying , "Accep t my values and 
my philosophy , and be happy ; otherwise be unhappy . "  Though she would 
disagree , I am doubt ful that the whole of  one ' s  rational th inking is 
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enough to guarantee .one ' s  happiness .  Scientific research is pointing mo re 
and mo re to biological and hormonal fac tors as ways of unders tanding why 
people are happy or miserable .  The statement that a man will necessar­
ily be happy if he holds rational values , and the man who does not hold 
ra tional values will not be , does not seem to me to be the whole truth 
concerning happiness . 
At this point I should like to d iscus s . Rand ' s  posit ion on 
"values" from what might aptly be described as a "bird ' s  eye view . " 
Hopefully this will help to clarify the meaning o f  real values or 
rat ional values as opposed to false or !�rat ional values . 
In Chapter I of  this paper we saw that Rand argues for and 
commends to her readers their own lives as the ir standard o f  value . 
After she finishes trying to establ ish life as the standard , she goes in 
search o f  values that promo te this standard . The f irst  value she 
examines is consciousnes� , and therein , for man , reason . She concludes 
that reason can indeed promote one ' s  l ife . She then argues that each 
value one holds should be examined thoroughly to see if it will or will 
not promote one ' s  life . The basic as sumpt ion here is that one ' s reason 
can perform this feat in most c ases . We see' from this that reason is 
bo th a value and a determiner of values . 
When Rand calls values "real , " she is referring to three things : 
first , that they . are life-promo ting , second, that they are j us tified by 
reason accord ing to the standard of one ' s  life , and , third , that· they 
are hierarchical . Hierarchical means two things for Rand : that one ' s  
values are arranged in an order that reflects the ultimate value o f  one ' s  
life , and that thus arranged they do not conflict . This , too , is due, 
more o f ten than not, to one ' s  reason . The holder of  real values , then , 
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is one that "values things in proportion to their importance in serving 
his l ife and well-being . "66 
When Rand uses the terms "irrational " or "false" values , she 
means that they are ei ther not life-promo t ing , not j ustified according 
to the intr insic value of one ' s  own l ife by reason , and /or that they are 
not hierarchical . Unl ike real values for which all three cond itions 
mus t  obtain ,  any one or more o f  the three conditions above can be real ized 
in an irrational value . In ot'l:ler word s ,  I may value �.
! say , happiness ; 
but if I value it intrinsically , and · use it as the s tandard fo r my act ions , 
then it is an irrat ional value . 
Rand is intensely concerned with values for the reasons that Paul 
Taylor indicates here : 
If we know what normat ive s tandards and rules have been 
accepted by a person , · we can tell what value j udgement s he 
will make . For no matter whether he has consciously . cho sen 
a set of  such norms as the resul t of  his own thinking , or has 
unconsciously ab sorbed them from his social environment , 
he ·will impl icitly refer to them whenever he j udges the good­
nes s  or badness of anything and the rightness or wrongness 
o f  his own and others ' actions • • • • ' Thus a person ' s values 
shape his whole way of l ife , guiding his cho ices and giving 
direction to his conduct . 67 
68 As Rand puts it , "Moral values are the mot ive power of a man ' s  ac t ions . "  
66  Rand , The Virtue of Selfishness , p .  40 .  
6 7 ' h ( 1 1 Paul Taylor , Ed . ,  Problems of  MOral Philo sop y Be mont , Ca if . : 
Dickenson Publishing Company , 19 6 7 ) , p .  3 .  
68
op. Cit . , p .  7 3 .  
85 
Rand agrees with Taylor that a person ' s  values are either the product 
of  his thinking or they are not .  S ince values do influence a person ' s  
act ions ,- Rand , o f  course , urges that they be the product o f  one ' s  think-
ing . Actually , Rand does no t conclude that thinking will neces sarily 
lead to the right action , for man is neither infallible nor omnis cient ; 
in fact , " if, in a complex moral issue , a man s truggles to determine what 
is right , and fails or makes an honest error , he cannot be regarded as 
'grey' ; morally , he is ' 'white . '  Errors o f  knowl·edge are not breaches of  
morality ; no proper moral code can demand infallib ility or  omniscience . "
69 
The effort to understand , to  j us tify , one ' s  course of  ac t ion and the 
values giving rise to a course o f  action with reference to the 
ult imat� value o f  one ' s  life will , on Rand ' s  view ,  help to eliminate the 
holding o f  irrat ional values .  On the other hand , i f  a person ' s  values 
are no t the product of his thinking , but are accepted "by subconscious 
associations , on faith , on someone ' s  authority ,  by some form of social 
osmo sis or blind imitat ion , "
7 0 
without a s tandard which j us t if ies certain 
values being accepted and adhered to and o thers being rej ected , then a 
person is apt to confuse real values with irrat ional values . Such a 
person is apt to  do actions which would be sanct ioned by the irrational 
value , but which would be wrong if subj ected to sc rutiny by one ' s  
reason. 
69 
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For example , let us cons ider a person who bl indly ac cepts the 
values o f  his cul ture . If, in this acceptance, two confl ict ing tenet s are 
ac cepted as valuable , then the actions is suing from one will be cond emned 
by the second tenet , thus br inging a p erson to the point of being unable 
to decide which o f  the two confl ict ing tenet s  and respect ive act ions is 
right and which is wr ong . As Paul Taylor indicates , if a person who 
bl indly ac cepts a set of moral beliefs 
is conf ront ed by others who have mo ral bel iefs . contrad ict ing 
his own and who ho ld them with as much certainty . as . he holds 
his own , he will feel lo st and b ewildered . His . state . of con­
fusion might then turn int o a deep d is illus ionment about 
mo ral ity . Unable to g ive an obj ec t ive , reas oned , . j us t if icat ion 
for his own convict ions , he may turn from dogmat ic . cer tainty to 
total scep t ic ism , and from total sceptic ism it is but a short 
s t ep to an 'amoral '. life--a life without any moral p rinc iples 
at all . 7 1 
Rand would agree with .Tayl o r ' s  s tatement . She would describ e  the " short 
step "  as one in which the person dec ides that there is no way to g ive a 
rat ional j us t ific at ion o f  his values , and tha� therefore , one value is 
as good as any o ther . 
On Rand ' s  view ,  hold ing internal+y cont rad ictory value s for which 
no j us t i f icat ion is po s s ible , or even hold ing value s which one has not 
j us t i fied , though they be consi s t ent , is to be avo ided for the reason 
that the result is o f t en the sc ep t ic ism ment ioned above , which , Rand 
would argue , is not conducive to the promo t ion o f  a per son ' s  l ife . Man 
has to ac t in cert ain ways and not in lo thers in order to survive ; in 
o rd er to act effec t ively he mus t  have principles to guide his act ions , 
7 1 Taylor , Probl ems o f  Mo ral Philosophy , p .  11 . 
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and one act ion or pr inc iple i s  no t as good as ano ther . In order to know 
what ac t ions and principles will promo te his life , a person mu s t  think 
as cl early and rat ionally as pos s ible . The fac t that the . adop tion of 
dif ferent principles may resul t in cons equences that he does no t want 
makes it very important · that . he t ry to discover which princ iples are 
j us tif iable and which are not . 
Fo r example , suppo se a person ac cepts the tenet s  "�ones ty is the 
best policy " and "One mus t  never do harm to o ther s . "  Merely . accep t ing 
these two tenets without def ining the rat ionale behind them , and , thus , 
coming to under s t and what . they mean both me taphys ically and exist en­
t ially , one might f ind himsel f in this posi t ion : John come s to Jane to 
inquire abou t the math test Jane j ust t oo k .  John tells Jane that if she 
doe s  no t give him the answers , he will fl unk the tes t , flunk the course , 
f lunk out o f  school , and have t o  go into the army , d isappo int ing his ill 
fathe r  to whom he has attended rather than clas s , · Jane , holder of the 
two t enets , thinks that to be hones t  in this inst ance entails harming 
John , but no t to harm entails cheat ing . She is r easonably unable to 
for to forsake either princ iple , but , f inal ly b reache s one by , say , 
giving John the answers . 
Her problem ,  as Rand would see it , i s  that she has not conceptual ly 
and rat ionally internal ized either the meaning of "harming other s "  or 
the meaning of "honesty . " As Jane sees it , the value conf l ict 
mus t ul t imat ely be resolved in a way wh ich will vio l ate one or the other 
o f  her value s . Rand would r eso lve the s ituat ion by saying that Jane 
sho uld be honest . Her honesty is no t what harms John . John ' s  own 
act ions o f  no t learning the mat erial and o f  no t preparing for the test 
harmed John . Jane had no thing . to do with John ' s  inability to pass the 
t�st , so she cannot be thought to have harmed John by not giving him 
the answer . The course of act ion which led ult imat ely t o  John ' s in-
ab ility to pass the test i s  no t Jane ' s  but John ' s  own action s . 
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Panaceas of fered in hopes o f  ab solving the confl ic t  this sort of 
s ituat ion produces include , ''Well , everybody do e s  it , "  which i s  fallac� 
ious thinking and/ or false , and , "If I hadn ' t ,  he would have fl unked the 
course , "  sugge s t ing that I would have been do ing something against him , 
which is false on Rand ' s  analy sis o f  ac t ion . 
Conf l ic t ing val ue s are pas s ed on by means o f  education "from one 
7 2 gene ra t ion to the next , "  as ar e bel ief s , knowledge , and skills . 
Beliefs and values vary from t ime to t ime , place to place , and from 
person to person at a g iven time and a g iven place , which creates further 
po s s ib il ity for confl ict . 
If oppo sing value s are . widely accepted as valid , people 
f ind it dif ficul t to accep t one and rej ect the other . In­
st ead , without openly rej ec t ing either value , the individual 
frequently o f fer s  some soc ially ac ceptable reason for 
ignoring one of them • • • a continuing clash of value s , 
however , may progres s ively weaken attachment to bo th al ter­
nat ive s , thus increasing the p o s s ib ility that neither c an 
serve as an e f fec t ive guide to act ion . 7 3 (my emphasi s )  
The st at ement above made by . El i Chinoy has many . examples . The " so cially 
ac cep table" stat ements , such as , "Busine s s  i s  business , "  "That ' s  j us t  
pol i t ic s , "  "Men will b e  men , "  are p anacea stat ements o ffered as excuses 
7 2 Eli Chinoy , Soc iety (New York : Random Hous e , 19 6 7 ) , p .  389 . 
7 3
Ib id . , pp • . 4 6 9 -4 7 0 . 
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and in j us t if ication for momentar ily d ropp ing one value , and fol lowing 
its contrary . Tha t  they are o f fered and accepted as r easons show that 
people are both cogni�ant at some level of the conf l ic t , and are e ither 
unwill ing or unable to perform the nece ssary · reasoning to resolve the 
cqnfl ic t s . This i s  no t to say that the conflic t s  can always be neatly 
and qu ickly disposed o f . Rand ' s  pos it ion would maintain that of two 
conflic t ing values , one will almos t  always be more bene f ic ia l  to my l ife 
than ano ther ; and that this is the best cr iter ion fo r deciding be tween 
the confl ict ing values . 
Th� great value that Rand places on man ' s  ability to reason i s  
der ived from her bel ief that without the u s e  o f  this capac ity a man ' s  
l ife is left to the blind c�ance o f  the moment . S ince each man ' s  l i fe 
is intrins ically valuable to him, Rand argue s , in company with the trad i­
t ion o f  "Enlightened " Ego ism , that one ought to give that l ife g reater 
assurance than the mere chance of the moment . 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUS ION 
Before conclud ing , I should like to deal with a flagrant incon-
sistency in Rand ' s  theory . It concerns her pos it ion on suic ide . Since 
I bel ieve that Rand ' s  position concerning sacrif ice of oneself to 
others , and the sacrifice of other s to oneself , is consistent with her 
basic claim, I think it is devastat ing to her theory for her to offer 
examples o f  virtue cons is t ing o f  suicide . In her essays , Atlas Shrugged , 
and in her play "Night o f  January . l6 , "  she does this . How can it be 
consistent to hold one ' s  life as the standard , and the achievement of 
one ' s  values as the moral purpose of one ' s  l ife , and to ho ld that some-
t imes it is acceptable to do away with that value ? Her claim that such 
an ac t is j ustificable takes plac e in Atlas Shrugged between John Galt 
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and Dagny Taggart . In j ustificat ion of this Rand of fers the following 
statement : " I f  a man . love s a woman so much that he does not care to 
survive her death , if l ife can have nothing more to offer him at that price , 
7 5  
then his dying t o  save her i s  no t a sacrif ice . "  What i f  a man loves 
his business so much that . he does not care to survive it s go ing into 
bankrup tcy? What if he loves his horse so much that he does not care to 
survive its go ing lame? What if a man .loves his Cocoa-Puffs so much 
that he does not care to survive their being sold out at the store? 
74  Rand , Atlas Shrugged ,  P .  1091 . 
7 5  
Rand , The Virtue o f  Self ishness , p p  • . 58-59 . 
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There is no rational way to draw the l �ne on this , and the very attemp t 
to do so shakes the foundat ion o f  Rand ' s  ethic s . In the p art icular scene 
7 6 b � tween Gal t  and Dagny , he admit s  that she has "a week , maybe less" 
7 7  
b efore she is put o n  "the [phys icalj . tortue rack . " But Gal t concl ude s 
7 8  
that " a t  the first ment ion of a threat" to her , h e  will take the l ife 
which might be ab l e  to save her . His dependence on the fact that his 
suicide would as sure her l ife is gro s sly unwarranted . Fur�her , what does 
it . mean · for Gal t to say that upon Dagny ' s  death that "there will be . no 
values left fo r m� to seek • • •  " ? 7 9Are there value s to seek af ter his 
own death? Weren ' t  there values to seek b efore he ever met Dagny? 
D idn ' t  he seek them? 
I thin� that Rand confuses f ight ing for something , . which on her 
fundamental claims should be one ' s  l ife , and giv ing up that which one 
should be · fight ing to maint ain . To say that a man i s  killed f ighting 
fo r his freedom, and to say a man kills himself because he does no t think 
there are any values to be sought given certain cond i t ion s , is to say 
two ent irely dif ferent things . On Rand ' s  theo ry one should no t be 
"will ing to die" at all . " Int egr ity is loyal ty to one ' s  convi ctions 
and value s ; it i s  the policy o f  acting in accordance with one ' s  value s , 
80 of expre s s ing , upho lding and t ranslat ing them into pract ical real it y . "  
7 6 Rand , Atlas Shrugged , p .  109 1 . 
7 7 Ib id . , p .  109 1 . 
7 8 Ibid . , P •  1091 . 
79 Ibid . , p .  1091 . 
80Rand , The Vir tue o f  Selfishness , p .  46 . 
The first act of integr ity on - the part of a person is to stand firm on 
his conviction that his life is intrinsically valuable , and that his 
death is - intrinsically dis-valuable . In many instances Rand reaffirms 
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this stand : "Science is a value only because it expands ,  enriches , and 
protect s man ' s life . It is not a value outside that context . No thing 
is a value outside .. that context . And ''Man ' s  life' lneans the singl e ,  
specific , irreplaceable lives o f  individual men . "
81 
Is ' �he act of 
suicide to be cons idered one that "expand s ,  enr iches · and ··protec ts man ' s  
life "?  Rather than trying to j ustify suic ide , Rand should be condemning 
tho se condit ions which help to bring it about , and trying to of fer so lu-
tiona to the problem .  
In summary , I have undertaken the examinat ion of Rand ' s  ethical 
theory with a view geared more to the cons istency of her claims than to 
their truth or fals ity . When I encountered claims I believed to be 
false , I tried to offer my own solut ions consis tent with he r basic posi­
tion , · and j us t ification of my solu tion . 
In this thesis we have deal t thoroughly with the arguments that 
one ' s  l ife is int rins ically valuable , that Rat �onality Product iveness , 
Pride and Self-esteem are · · values/virtues , the is sue and meaning of non-
sacrif ice in her theory of moral ob ligat ion , and her view of happ iness . 
None of these areas were free of problems . I found that the plu�al ist 
position is a viab le option to Rand ' s  monis tic pne and that her argument s 
did no t fully treat the prob lems o f  �ntrins ic value . In 
81 
Ib id • , p • 8 3 • 
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Chapter I I  when I dis cussed extrins ic values /virtues , I found that 
"Pride " did not exemplify Rand ' s  definition o f  virtue , and her argu­
ment s concerning Pride were very abst ruse and confusing . The theory o f  
moral obl igat ion . in Obj ect ivism is , I think , a consistent and a defens� 
ible one given Rand ' s  fundamental . premisses . The problem as pow it 
can be maintained that I should not sacrif ice another to myself canno t 
be solved unt il the concep t o f  rights is brough t in . Thus , even . her 
theory of moral obl igat ion presents unique problems of it s own . Finally , 
Rand ' s  pos it ion regard ing happ iness was the mo st problemat ical part of  
the paper . Her def init ions , concepts , and framework surrounding these , 
we re unclear· and imprec ise . I could no t sanct ion many of her state-
ment s regarding happ iness for the reasons that (a) they seemed inconsistent 
wit� her basic premiss , or (b ) they seemed false . 
Many of  the prob lems in Rand resul t from the fact that Rand is 
almo st exclusively concerned with ethics . Her metaphysical po sit ion is 
often stated , but is weakly supported , if at all . She has no clear , 
consistent epis temology , and though I believe that she is presently 
engaged in the development of one , the fact . that , she has no t completed 
this proj ect hampers almo st any attemp t to understand how she can 
warrant the truth of all she claims to know . I did no t attempt to 
quest ion her assumpt ion that reason gives us the true picture of things 
simply because that would have been another thesis in itself . 
I tried to present her ethical pos it ion as it is , to expl ain that 
po sition , and where needed , to render it cons istent internally with her 
o ther claims . I know from my expo sure to her writings that she is mo re 
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concerned that people no t sacrif ice themselves , than she is that they 
not sacrifice others . This s tems from her belief that the former is 
much more prevalent than the latter . Fur ther , I think that she may 
bel ieve that if those who are sacrificing themselves to others stopped , 
that tho se who are sacrificing o thers to themselves would eventually 
run out of vic t ims . If the dominant trend were the sacrificing o f  other s 
to oneself , I think that she would be emphasizing that side of her 
theory of  obligation . 
The conclusions I have drawn from this thesis are . that (1 ) of ten 
Rand ' s  terms and posit ions seem to slip and to slide into each other 
fo r lack of cl ear and prec ise def init ions ; ( 2 )  Rand of ten makes unqual i­
fied claims , , and therefo re , unacceptable assert ions that tend to hamper 
the bel ievab il it y of her main p,o ints·;. and (3)  that Rand ' s  po sition , if 
ever rel ieved of these slippery terms , e . g . , real and rational , and if 
ever stripped of the flat universal isms that she is given to , can be 
made a coherent , consistent rule-egoism.  
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